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ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the
cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement—a theory flowing
from the Coase Theorem.
The cost-benefit analysis weighs
settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction
cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlements
are superior and so most trials are considered “errors.” While simple
in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This Article is
a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial.
It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing
theory of legal disputes. In addition to probability and transaction
cost, dispute risk must capture the concepts of weight of evidence,
variance of case disposition, and confidence in assessment. In much
the same way that cost of capital, a measure of financial risk, affects
the valuation of firms, the risks associated with litigation and
settlement imply a cost of resolution of which transaction cost is but
one component. By focusing on transaction cost, the standard model
underestimates true economic cost. Because the expenditure of
transaction cost reduces uncertainty, transaction cost and risk
adjusted valuation are in dynamic tension. Under this approach,
settlement and litigation are different pricing mechanisms in the
absence of market pricing and are imperfect substitutes operating in
varying conditions of uncertainty. Accordingly, this Article rejects
the normative axiom that litigation is inferior to settlement—a
conclusion having broad policy implications in the administration of
justice.

INTRODUCTION
This Article challenges the central tenet of the economic theory of legal
bargaining—the normative superiority of settlement. For many years, law and
economics scholarship has subscribed to the conventional wisdom that the
valuation of a legal dispute is simply its “expected value,” defined as the
probability of judgment multiplied by the expected damage award.1 The
selection of settlement or litigation is seen through the prism of transaction
1 See, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399 (1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984); Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969).
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cost economics: If a probabilistic value of a lawsuit can be calculated, a
settlement is better since litigants can save the cost of litigation. The idea is
elegant in its simplicity, but elegance is not the measure of correctness of
positive theory or persuasiveness of normative prescription. Despite the
siren’s call of efficiency, settlements are rejected and cases are tried. In the
search for an explanation, the common theme has been an “error” of some sort
(of judgment, perception, or strategy). This proposition is now axiomatic.2
The hostility to litigation is manifest. Trial has been described in such colorful
terms as a “disease”3 and a “pathological event.”4

2 This is expressed in “the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good
trial.” In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1986). Along this sentiment, a diverse array of scholars and analytic viewpoints has generally agreed that
settlement is superior or more efficient. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982) (Trial “represents a bargaining
breakdown.”); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1074 (1989) (Trials result from “mistaken prediction[s]” made by
parties.); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
36 (1996) (“Settlement is favored in the law for a variety of reasons.”); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
320 (1991) (“A trial is a failure.”); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 107–08 (1994) (noting that most scholars
believe “that trials represent mistakes—breakdowns in the bargaining process—that leave the litigants and
society worse off than they would have been had settlement been reached”); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees
and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 327 (1988) (“Settlement is more efficient for the
parties, giving them more of what they hoped to gain at less cost.”); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 122 (1983) (“[B]argaining and settlement are the prevalent and, for
plaintiffs, perhaps the most cost-effective activity that occurs when cases are filed.”); cf. infra notes 4, 14. Not
surprisingly, the judicial view is consistent with the majority scholarly perspective. See, e.g., Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (“In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs
as well as defendants.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat.
1071, 1075–76; G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 664 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Settling
litigation is valuable, and courts should promote it.”). Litigation is inefficient in distributing compensation
when compared to insurance or compensation fund schemes, particularly in circumstances of mass
catastrophes. See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 440 (2005). But this is a separate question
from whether litigation is inefficient compared to settlement in resolving an ambiguous right through the
litigation process.
3 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (“Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but serious enough to be avoided at any
reasonable cost.” (footnote omitted)).
4 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 261 n.200 (1995) (It is “‘a mistake to view trial as a pathological event,
resulting from settlement miscalculations [by] the parties.’”) (quoting Edward H. Cooper, Minutes of the
Advisory Committee of Civil Rules 20 (Oct. 21–23, 1993, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV101993-min.pdf, which noted that this was “the most direct view” of members of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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It is easy to see how litigants find themselves at trial due to miscalculation.
Cases do not settle early when transaction cost savings would be the greatest.
They settle in mid-litigation when previous settlement attempts, on roughly
similar terms, have failed. Still many others settle late when most transaction
costs have become sunk costs.5 Common explanations are error, strategic
behavior, or optimism.6 Human failing is a convenient explanation for many
things gone awry. Viewed in the unflattering light of the standard economic
theory, the enormous legal and judicial infrastructure supporting the institution
of civil litigation is a monument to economic waste.7 Human error and
irrationality certainly explain some observations, but beneath the apparent
plausibility of these conventional explanations, there is an undercurrent of
doubt: is there a systematic selection process or valuational concept that
explains the apparent irrationality of litigation, settlement behavior, and
ultimately the choice of trial? The normative aspiration is that participants
should assess the probability of outcome (an exercise in the prediction of legal
decisions), calculate the expected value, and settle on a valuation that should
have converged absent “optimism.”8 This Article questions whether this
economic theory prescribes rational behavior or wishful ideal.

5 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 69 (arguing that sunk cost of litigation should be ignored); see also
RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 116 (8th ed. 2006) (“Sunk costs are like
spilled milk: They are past and irreversible outflows. Because sunk costs are bygones, they cannot be affected
by the decision to accept or reject the project, and so they should be ignored.”). This view of sunk costs
assumes the American rule, which does not award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. See infra note 48.
6 See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 321 (reviewing scholarly literature showing that trials are
explained by “a failure in parties’ predictions of the behavior of the court” or by “a failure of bargaining
between the parties”).
7 According to a recent study, the number of trials decreased from 1962 to 2002, both in absolute
numbers and percentages. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 tbl.1, 507 tbl.4 (2004) (trial rate in
federal civil actions declined from 11.5% to 1.8% from 1962 to 2002; civil trials in twenty-two states declined
from 36.1% to 15.8% from 1976 to 2002). Perhaps this dramatic decrease in number indicates a sudden
market correction for the purportedly long-running inefficiency. But the data may also suggest the contrary—
trials are decreasing because of “a striking philosophical, ideologically driven view that is hostile to trials.”
Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at N1
(quoting Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); see also Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339, 1342 (1994) (“Judges actively intervene in a significant portion of civil cases in American
courts.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,”
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982
(2003) (arguing that notions of “efficiency” are undermining the fundamental right to a day in court through
procedural application such as summary judgment).
8 See infra note 46.
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This Article argues that the standard economic model overstates the case
for both human error and prescience. The model assumes a degree of
impossible rationality by implying both the existence of an objective ex ante
probability of the decision standard and the ability of the parties to find it. The
impossibility of accurate predictions of uniquely human events cannot be
assumed away for convenience of economic theory.9 The standard model
misstates the applicability of expected value and the overarching consideration
of transaction cost economics. This Article proposes an alternative economic
theory of legal bargaining—a pricing theory incorporating the risks associated
with settlement and litigation. It adopts the microeconomic cornerstones of
utility (value) maximization, cost-benefit analysis, and rational choice, but
goes further to apply financial economics to determine the true economic cost
of uncertainty (risk).10 The academic discipline of financial economics
fundamentally deals with “the valuation of cash flows that extend over time
and are usually uncertain.”11 Since settlement and litigation involve the
disbursement of cash flow under conditions of information imperfection and
uncertainty, the academic discipline of financial economics is most relevant to
a theoretical discourse on legal bargaining. Yet until recently, there has been
little interdisciplinary application of the valuational techniques of finance
theory to bargaining problems.12

9 Financial economic research since 1900 has conclusively shown that individual market participants
cannot accurately predict future prices or market outcomes. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
10 The economic literature sometimes distinguishes risk and uncertainty in that risk consists of future
outcomes that have a known distribution, while uncertainty describes those that have unknown distributions.
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233–34 (1921); see also Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Errors
and the Functioning of Tort Liability, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 165, 166 n.1 (2005). This Article does not
make this distinction, and will use the two terms interchangeably. As explained in Part IV, most cases do not
have probability distributions from which a probability of success can be inferred. If these probability
distributions existed, like actuarial tables and reliable as such, they would have sparked a revolution in the
legal profession; the work of attorneys would have given way to risk management firms. Thus far, we have
not seen this revolution come to pass.
11 STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 1 (2005).
12 An early proponent was Bradford Cornell who applied a simple option pricing model to legal
valuation. Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173
(1990). Recently, Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang extended Cornell’s option pricing model. Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1267 (2006). While this Article recognizes the value of an imbedded option, see infra Part V.C., the
approach to valuation is from the perspective of an asset pricing model, see infra Part V.D. The imbedded
option to pursue trial is a component of value, but not the main driver of the valuation of a lawsuit.
Fundamentally, a lawsuit is a capital asset that generates an expected, but risky, cash flow. See Robert J. Rhee,
The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2006).
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Under the pricing theory proposed here, litigation can offer a cheaper cost
of resolution than settlement. This statement is counterintuitive only if the cost
of resolution is seen as a cash or cash equivalent outlay, like transaction cost in
litigation. But if the cost of resolution is seen in the broader context of
valuation, then it is intuitive that litigation can be cheaper under certain pricing
conditions, and thus preferred. This Article posits that any given disputed
claim has a cost of resolution, which is the total economic cost of dispute risk.
The governing condition of a lawsuit is the uncertainty of outcome. Yet risk is
not captured in the notions of probability and expected value, which simply
measure the expectation of outcome but not its riskiness. A risk-adjusted
valuation must incorporate the concepts of weight of evidence, confidence in
assessment, and variance of case disposition from expectation.
The
conventional cost-benefit analysis ignores these factors and overstates the
importance of transaction cost surplus.
Litigation is not an obsolete substitute for settlement, but an imperfect
one.13 The two involve different risk profiles and cost implications. Certainly
litigation involves greater transaction cost, but settlement is not cost free either.
While many have asked, “What is the cost of litigation?,” few have asked the
less obvious but equally important question: “What is the cost of settlement?”
Contrary to conventional thought, settlement is not an arbitrage proposition
where the selection of certainty over risk is cost free; settlement can be as
much of a gamble as trial. Like the cost of equity in the valuation of firms, the
cost of settlement is not as apparent for it is imbedded in the valuation. A riskbased valuation model explains many apparently irrational behaviors: for
example, reluctance to settle early when transaction cost savings are the
greatest, “eleventh-hour” settlements when such savings are mostly depleted,
and (some would say) decisions to go to trial. Seen through the prism of the
standard analysis, these decisions seem irrational, or at least questionable. But
if principles of financial economics are considered, apparent “errors” may be
simply rational choices in the face of dynamic uncertainty. The fundamental
problem is one of a coherent pricing scheme in the absence of market pricing.
This Article seeks to provide a balanced view of the complexities of the
selection between settlement and litigation within the framework of economic
efficiency. The current environment is one of public, governmental,
professional, judicial, and academic hostility toward litigation, and particularly
13 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 3, at 63 (“Formal litigation is presented not as an adjunct but as an
alternative to private settlement; not as an aid but as a threat.”).
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trials, as a method of dispute resolution, and the shibboleth has been economic
waste.14 Litigation has been perceived as the prodigal partner in the business
of dispute resolution. To be clear, this Article does not dispute that settlement
frequently offers a better resolution of disputes. The goal of this Article is not
to diminish the status of settlement, but to elevate litigation as a true partner—
one with a minority interest perhaps, given the increasing rarity of trials, but
with equal rights nevertheless.15 The intellectual hostility toward litigation has
far-reaching impact, touching on virtually every aspect of the administration of
justice.16 The axiomatic belief that settlement is inherently superior is
regrettable, for it is far from clear that as a general rule, settlement—more
precisely, settlement independent of litigation—provides the least costly
economic transaction in contested actions.17
I. ASSUMPTIONS
Bargaining over a legal claim is an infinitely complex topic because the
field is as fecund as the human endeavor. A grand theory capturing the myriad
of economic and psychological factors is elusive. Instead, like a brushstroke of
an impressionistic painting, each theory adds to the mosaic. The scope of any
14 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 2–4, 7 (scholars expressing or acknowledging a bias against
litigation); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 8–9 (1999) (noting the “hostility to the trial”);
Galanter, supra note 7, at 517–18 & n.106 (noting the myths of “out of control” juries and “litigation
explosion” in the general public and popular media); Miller, supra note 7, at 985–96 (discussing the popular
misconception of the “litigation explosion”); Press Release, White House, President Discusses Lawsuit Abuse
at White House Economy Conference (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/
20041215-11.html (President Bush discussing abusive litigation). A minority of scholars have been vocal
about the benefits of litigation and trial. See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 627 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Marc
Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55; cf. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell:
Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Samuel R. Gross, The
American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 754 (1987).
15 Settlement will always be the more dominant form of dispute resolution because principles of financial
economics, predicated on the assumption that most investors are risk averse, predict that, all other factors
being equal, a rational party always prefers the sum certain over its expected value equivalent. See id.
16 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7. Courts have favored settlement over litigation. See supra note 2.
Rules of procedure encourage settlements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9), 23(e), 68; see also Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1986) (interpreting Rule 23(e) to promote settlements); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5
(1985) (“The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation.”); Charles R. Richey,
Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerations for the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct.
1989); Gross & Syverud, supra note 3, at 2–3 (“We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil
justice that embodies and expresses that preference in everything from the rules of procedure and evidence, to
appellate opinions, to legal scholarship, to the daily work of our trial judges.” (footnotes omitted)).
17 Indeed, litigation and settlement are often inextricably intertwined in that settlement cannot occur in
many cases without vigorous litigation.
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work in the economics of legal bargaining is limited by its assumptions, and so
they must be clearly stated.18 The following assumptions are made:
1. This Article analyzes contested civil actions, defined as nonfrivolous
actions that would survive pretrial disposition.19 The purpose is two-fold:
First, to exclude frivolous actions, which magnify the importance of
transaction costs and repeat play considerations; second, to isolate cases that
could either settle or go to trial, a procedural option held by each party, thus
allowing an easier analysis of the reasons for its exercise or nonexercise.
2. Attorney and client interests are perfectly aligned such that agency cost
is assumed to be zero. This assumption is unrealistic, but the incorporation of
agency cost would complicate a model of the selection of trial and settlement.
This Article is an effort to construct a simple model of an important question.
The complexity of agency cost is better left for another day.
3. This Article is limited to an analysis of the economic costs of civil
actions. Aspects of psychological and game theory are not considered, though
these elements can never be removed from practice and are important to the
larger theory of bargaining.20 Repeat play complicates valuation and raises the
problem of frivolous actions and strategic behavior. It is discussed tangentially
in the context of individual preferences about risk.
4. This Article is not an exploration of rationality, a concept pregnant with
economic, philosophical, and jurisprudential meaning.21 But the concept
touches all issues of price and value, and so a frame of reference is needed.
This Article defines rationality in economic transactions as acts within ethical
18 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 2–6 (3d ed. 2003) (noting
the limitations placed on economic theory by the necessary use of assumptions); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 707 (2004) (“Sometimes, the law and
economics literature shoe-horns this more complex world of case disposition into the simple settlement–trial
model.”). Such criticism of the “dismal science” is not new. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 78 (7th ed. 1999).
19 About 20% of cases are terminated by nontrial adjudication. See Hadfield, supra note 18, at 730 tbl.7;
Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 164 tbl.2 (1986)
(22% pretrial dispositions); Trubek et al., supra note 2, at 89 (22.5% of the cases studied were dismissed or
judgment was rendered on the merits).
20 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14–29 (1982) (noting that one of the
central problem of bargaining is strategic behavior); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 2 (discussing
psychological impediments to bargaining); Thomas J. Miceli, Settlement Strategies, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 473
(1998) (discussing the economics of settlement strategies).
21 See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429 (1972)
(describing rationality as “a chameleon among words” in the context of the Coase Theorem).
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bounds in furtherance of value maximization (or cost minimization) and not
influenced by subjective bias or psychological distortions that have no basis in
fact or are based on illogical connections among premises, facts, and beliefs.22
This Article assumes a minimum level of reasoned thought to satisfy the
condition of rationality. The hope is that this assumption is not questioned in a
way such that the definition slides into reductio ad absurdum or philosophical
atomism. Bias is distinguished from preference, which defines the utility
function.23 Degrees of rationality are not distinguished, i.e., whether the
degree of belief or feeling about a proposition is warranted by a proportional
weight of facts, inferences, and logical connections based on some objective
scale. For simplicity only, it is assumed that rationality is not conferred with
varying honorifics.
More importantly, rationality does not impute predictive powers beyond
the capabilities of individuals or markets.24 Efficient markets are only possible
when participants err in their assessments as often as they are accurate.
Accurate predictions of future prices by individual market participants are
impossible in the markets, and there is no reason why this truth does not apply
with more force to the predictions of legal decisions given that a civil action is
not subject to market pricing, is not supported by risk management services or
a derivative market, and is one of the most illiquid of assets or liabilities.25
The abilities of disputants are assumed for what they are and not what they
should be. Bad results as determined ex post are simply a part of the human
condition,26 and this Article’s ascribe no normative condemnation so long as
the ex ante belief was rational.

22 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (6th ed. 2003) (“Rationality means . . . a
disposition to choose, consciously or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to
have.”); Cooter, supra note 20, at 22 (Rational expectations are those that “contain no systematic bias, that is,
the subjective expectations correspond to the objective frequencies of the random event.”).
23 Risk aversion and affinity are rational because a person derives utility from avoiding or seeking risk.
On the other hand, the phenomenon of heuristic “framing,” as discovered by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, raises the issue of whether such behavior is irrational, or whether rationality is bounded. See
generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
24 See infra notes 182–183.
25 See Earl Johnson, Jr., Lawyers’ Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions,
15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 567, 573 (1980–81) (“During litigation, lawyers operate in a world of imperfect
information and probability estimation: the maximum expected net benefit target is easier to state than it is to
hit.”).
26 See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 35 (2d ed.
2004) (“Once the outcomes are observed, it usually is easy to say what would have been the best decision.
However, we cannot evaluate decisions from this perspective, which is why probability distributions are so

RHEE GALLEYSFINAL

628

3/15/2007 11:52:42 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

5. The scholarly literature has defined transaction cost in different ways.27
This Article defines transaction cost in the dispute resolution context narrowly:
the direct economic costs incurred by the parties, primarily costs associated
with inspection, bargaining, enforcement, and litigation. These costs are
typically cash expenses, like attorneys’ fees, or reducible to cash equivalents,
like time and effort. Construed broadly, transaction costs could include the
secondary costs associated with the judicial infrastructure. If, however,
valuation is the issue, a cost to others is not a cost to self and thus irrelevant.
This observation is not intended to imply the irrelevance of grander policy
issues or perhaps the normative aspirations of society, but simply to highlight
that markets work efficiently because each person pursues self-interest.28 The
goal of this Article is to analyze the efficient price qua each party, which is
simply value maximization through, among other things, the pursuit of the
lowest cost. A party would be indifferent to the cost incurred by others if it is
neutral to her valuation, and therefore this is the assumption.29

important.”); Cooter, supra note 20, at 20 (Bargaining sometimes fails because “the best move ex ante turns
out to be a bad move ex post.”).
27 Cooter, supra note 20, at 16. Coase defined it:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to
deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure
that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). Cooter defined transaction costs of
bargaining as “the cost of communicating among the parties (including the value of time used up in sending
messages), making side payments (the cost of the transaction, not the value of what is exchanged), and the cost
of excluding people from sharing in the benefits exchanged by the parties.” Cooter, supra note 20, at 16; see
also Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. &
ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968) (“By transaction costs, I have in mind costs like those of getting large numbers of
people together to bargain, and costs of excluding free loaders.”).
28 This Article does not mean to suggest that self-interest is the only motivation for individuals or
markets. Self-interest is a primary guide in litigation, which often results in a serious conflict between parties
who typically have diametrically opposed interests. See infra note 50. A plaintiff’s dollar gained in settlement
or judgment is a defendant’s dollar lost. In the larger perspective, however, there is a place in economic
thought and models for ethics and feelings for the welfare of others. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS &
ECONOMICS (1988). Adam Smith, the founding father of modern economics, was not only an economist, but
also a moral philosopher. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
2002) (1759).
29 Two general arguments are that disputants should use the court system parsimoniously and that the
legal infrastructure should be designed to minimize litigation. This argument states an unachievable ideal. We
should not expect market participants to act altruistically or voluntarily bear the obligation of some greater
societal ideal. Nor does this Article accept the notion that centralized planning of such a resource through
normative prescriptions best achieves efficiency. The decision to litigate or settle, and at what price, should be
left to the parties who know their own interests, free from any institutional bias. If access to courts is “free,”
parties will consider only the costs they incur in calculating the value of the dispute. The argument that
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These assumptions allow an isolated study of the elementary economics of
a disputed claim—a limited goal, but one rich in policy implications. The
perspective is that of a financier or investor in an economic project.30 This
Article answers a simple question: when two parties dispute an ambiguous
right that would warrant resolution by trial if one party so chooses, how does
each party value the claim and make a rational choice either to settle or
exercise the trial option?
II. STANDARD ECONOMIC MODEL OF BARGAINING
A. Transaction Cost Efficiency
The key to any economic transaction is achieving maximum price at the
lowest cost,31 and so bargaining theory lends itself to economic analysis. The
economic theory of legal bargaining has a well-developed history. Ronald
Coase’s landmark article, The Problem of Social Cost,32 is credited with
providing the doctrinal precursor to the standard economic model of
bargaining.33 The broadest lesson from the Coase Theorem is that the
economic efficiency of any transaction is dependent, in part at least, on its
litigation is subsidized dispute resolution and thus distorts the pricing of disputes rings hollow. The judicial
infrastructure is largely a fixed overhead. It is paid for by taxes or borrowings, and it belongs to the users as
needed. The cost of judicial administration is not free, but it is built into the tax and debt system. If the
argument is that efficient bargaining can reduce the overall cost of the judicial system, I cannot see the day in
which judges would be laid off in large numbers as a result of judicial downsizing. If the argument is that
parsimony controls the growth of the judicial infrastructure, the issue is whether such additional cost is
justifiable in relation to other factors, such as population and wage growth, costs in relation to other incurred
costs (e.g., the cost of settlement), and extrapolation of the efficient level of judicial system use. At some
point in the cost-benefit debate, the difficult and tedious task of calculating the dollar value of the costs and
benefits must be done to determine the intellectual stake at issue rather than maintaining the abstractness of
“costs” and “efficiency.” In the end, the best arbiters of the price of the dispute are the parties themselves, and
they should be free to set this price in the forum they choose without undue institutional, academic, legal, or
social pressures manifested in rules, policies, and attitudes.
30 Increasingly, scholars are analyzing lawsuits from the perspective of finance theory. See Cornell,
supra note 12, at 173 (considering a lawsuit as an “investment”); Grundfest & Huang, supra note 12, at 1269–
70, 1269 n.1 (“Lawsuits and investment projects have much in common.”); Rhee, supra note 12 (considering a
lawsuit as a capital asset subject to modeling under asset pricing principles); see also Robert J. Rhee, The
Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111,
156–57 (2004) (analogizing a lawsuit to a financial project in which “[t]he plaintiff provides the business
opportunity, and the attorney provides not only the intellectual capital and labor but often the financial capital
in the form of contingent attorney’s fees and costs”).
31 See Landes, supra note 1, at 61 (“The basic assumption of the model is that both the prosecutor and the
defendant maximize their utility, appropriately defined, subject to a constraint on their resources.”).
32 Coase, supra note 27.
33 See Landes, supra note 1, at 102 n.61.
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transaction cost.34 All else being equal (a significant condition), the least
costly transaction is more efficient and thus maximizes value. The implication
of the Coase Theorem is applicable to a prescriptive theory of bargaining.
Scholars subsequently adopted the mantra of surplus maximization through
transaction cost efficiency, and prescribed the goal of closing the gap between
the real world of litigation costs and the ideal Coasian world of frictionless
transactions. One of the earliest works was a well-written, insightful student
note that set forth all the essential elements of the basic standard model:
To compute his bargaining limit, plaintiff will (1) multiply the
expected damage award by the probability that the court will award it
to him, (2) subtract from the product in (1) the amount of his
anticipated litigation costs, (3) add his settlement costs, and (4)
subtract his opportunity gains from receiving payment now as
35
opposed to a judgment later.

William Landes and Richard Posner struck the same theme of analyzing
valuation from a cost-benefit perspective.36 Courts, too, have echoed a similar
economic approach.37 Under this conventional approach, transaction cost is
34 The Coase Theorem states: “With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning
liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources.” Coase, supra note 27, at 10; see
also Calabresi, supra note 27, at 68 (“[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal
impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains.”).
But see Cooter, supra note 20, at 17 (arguing that the Coase Theorem is flawed because it assumes an
optimistic attitude toward the ability of people to distribute economic surplus).
35 Friedman, supra note 1, at 80. This note is a sophisticated economic analysis that established most of
the basic ideas about the valuation of a legal dispute. It covers the time value of costs, the effect of sunk costs
on settlement decision, marginal cost analysis, and opportunity costs.
36 See Landes, supra note 1, at 61, 101–02; Posner, supra note 1, at 417–18. Posner formulates the
standard model as:

The plaintiff’s minimum offer is the expected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement
costs, the expected value of the litigation being the present value of the judgment if he wins,
multiplied by the probability (as he estimates it) of his winning, minus the present value of his
litigation expenses. The defendant’s maximum offer is the expected cost of the litigation to him
and consists of his litigation expenses, plus the cost of an adverse judgment multiplied by the
probability as he estimates it of the plaintiff’s winning (which is equal to one minus the
probability of his winning), minus his settlement costs.
Id. at 418. Priest and Klein credit Landes and Posner with developing the standard economic model of
bargaining, Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 4 n.16, but much of the credit must go to Friedman’s note which
was published several years before Landes and Posner published their outstanding articles. See Friedman,
supra note 1.
37 “Most defendants are unlikely to settle unless the cost of the predicted judgment, discounted by its
probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are greater than the cost of the settlement package.”
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986).
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seen as a waste if the parties can agree on the expected value, which hinges on
a probabilistic assessment. While subsequent scholarship has augmented the
idea,38 this basic cost-benefit analysis is the reference point for economically
oriented scholarship.39 Thus, it is termed the “standard economic model” for
convenience.
The standard model lends itself to simple mathematical expressions where
V is settlement valuation, J is expected judgment amount, P is probability of
judgment, and T is transaction cost. The ministerial function of time value of
money adjustment is ignored.40 Also, this Article ignores the cash outlay of
settlement cost because it is de minimis relative to litigation cost.41 A
defendant should settle only if V ≤ (J x P) + T. A plaintiff should settle only if
V ≥ (J x P) − T. If the defendant’s maximum value is greater than the
plaintiff’s minimum value, which is to say that the valuations intersect, a
positive contract zone exists. The larger this contract zone, the greater is the
possibility of settlement absent strategic bargaining.42 The relationship
between probability and transaction cost can be seen by rearranging the above
equations. Assuming a common J and T and noting the aggregate transaction
cost as B, trial results only if this trial inequality holds true: J x Pp − T > J x Pd
+ T.43 This inequality can be restated: (Pp − Pd) x J > B.44 Thus, trial results

38 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404 (1984) (discussing the effects of asymmetric information on bargaining); Cooter et al., supra note
2, at 226, 231 (positing that the surplus created from a settlement may lead to strategic bargaining and a
“problem of distribution”).
39 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1075; Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial
Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 161 (1988); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Landes,
supra note 1; Posner, supra note 1; Priest & Klein, supra note 1; Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution,
Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988).
40 Obviously, all else being the same, the defendant would prefer a later payout because there is an
opportunity cost associated with an early payout, and for the same reason the plaintiff would prefer an earlier
payoff.
41 For the purpose of modeling, scholars have considered settlement cost to be “nil.” See Cooter &
Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1075. Of course, if the concept of cost is expanded beyond simply the direct cash
outlays associated with negotiating and executing settlement, then the settlement cost can far exceed the
expected litigation costs. See Rhee, supra note 12.
42 See Wittman, supra note 39, at 319 (“[T]he greater the cost of a trial relative to the cost of a
settlement, the greater the likelihood of a settlement.”). But see Cooter, supra note 20, at 17–18 (Large
contract zones may result in greater strategic behavior that reduces the likelihood of settlement.).
43 POSNER, supra note 22, at 568–69.
44 Id. Note the remarkable similarity to the Hand Formula. See discussion infra Part III. There is a
simple explanation for this. Both the standard model and the Hand Formula are conventional cost-benefit
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when the difference in probabilistic assessments is greater than the aggregate
transaction cost. If the parties have the same assessment such that (Pp − Pd) =
0, or if one party is more pessimistic than the other such that (Pp − Pd) < 0, the
trial inequality would not hold true and settlement would result.45 Generally,
litigation occurs only if at least one party is “optimistic” about the outcome of
the litigation.46
Thus, settlement is a function of transaction cost economics. The prospect
of a high transaction cost relative to expected value tends to facilitate
settlement. The extreme example is a frivolous lawsuit in which settlement
may be reached for nuisance value.47 The prospect of a low transaction cost
relative to the stake tends to facilitate litigation.48 Minute differences in
probability assessments may exceed the value of the potential surplus. Thus,
the standard economic model is best understood as a prescription to mimic the
idealized Coasian world of private bargains, zero transaction costs, costless
pricing system, and irrelevance of legal rules.
B. Selection Theory of Trial and Settlement
While the standard model speaks to efficiency, it is silent as to whether a
systematic selection of settlement or trial exists, or whether selection is simply
random. Certainly random errors explain some selections. In hindsight, some
disputes should have been settled. But a bad result must be distinguished from
an error, which is the result of an ex ante irrational decision, made on the basis
of inadequate facts, speculation (gambling), or subjective bias. Some disputes
analyses with an underlying assumption of wealth maximization. Moreover, both models focus on the concept
of probability as the key valuational parameter.
45 POSNER, supra note 22, at 569; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 285
n.7 (1994) (“Parties are equally likely to be pessimistic about their chances, but in these cases there is always
settlement.”).
46 POSNER, supra note 22, at 569. “Optimistic” is a poor choice of term. Optimism suggests irrationality,
subjective bias, or differences in assessments due to information asymmetry or strategic bargaining. Thus, it is
“misleading” to label one party as “optimistic” when legitimate differences in opinion in the face of
uncertainty result in litigation. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 45, at 285 n.7.
47 Cf. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 12, at 1299–1305 (arguing that the negative expected value case
can have substantial settlement value due to its optionality). But see Rhee, supra note 12, at 212–23
(criticizing an option analogy).
48 See Posner, supra note 1, at 419 n.29 (“There is empirical evidence that higher stakes do increase the
likelihood of litigation.”). Allocating legal costs under the American and English rules significantly affects the
decisions to sue, settle, and try a case. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1078; A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 141 (1998); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
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end in trial because ex ante one party or both badly misjudged the situation
(just as some disputes settle for precisely the same reason). These errors are
random and unpredictable, and thus there is no underlying order to when
people make bad judgments.
Randomness also explains unpredictable risk-taking behaviors.
Negotiation may break down due to strategic bargaining behaviors such as the
assertion of excessive valuations, deliberate misrepresentation, “hard”
bargaining, calculated delay, obstruction, and other arguably noncooperative
behavior. The motivation for these behaviors is the opportunity for a superior
settlement.49 Self-interest is a rational condition.50 Strategic behavior cannot
be faulted because the instinct to test fate is as old as human history.51
Bargaining entails a great deal of informed risk taking and strategy. Unless
accurate foresight is imported into a normative view of the bargaining process,
hindsight cannot be used to judge rationality.52 Indeed, while increasing the
likelihood of trial, strategic behavior may play a beneficial role for society
because it may be a natural arbiter of liability, favoring those who have a
stronger conviction or pursue their claims more aggressively. To the extent
that the merit of a claim is aligned with such sentiments, these parties are more
likely to have a greater interest in “winning” the settlement game; they may
take greater risk for greater potential gain, which may be seen as one’s just
reward. When and how strategic behavior will manifest in individual cases is
unpredictable. Thus, strategic behavior also explains a large portion of the
cases that do not settle.
George Priest and Benjamin Klein suggest that selection of settlement and
trial is also affected by factors independent of the decision process. They
propose a systematic selection hypothesis based on characteristics of the case

49 See Cooter et al., supra note 2, at 226, 231 (positing that surplus created from a settlement may lead to
a “problem of distribution” and strategic bargaining); Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 327–30 (“Trials,
according to the [strategic bargaining] model, consist largely of cases where gambles like this did not pay
off—where hard bargaining strategies caused negotiations to fail.”).
50 Adam Smith provided the most eloquent and enduring articulation of this truth: “It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15
(Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1994) (1776). “By pursuing [their] own interest [they] frequently
promote[] that of the society more effectually than when [they] really intend[] to promote it.” Id. at 485.
51 See generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1996)
(popular treatment of the subject of risk).
52 See infra Part III.C.
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merit.53 Their model is mathematically based and complex. The following is a
simplified description. The argument begins by assuming that each party
knows the “decision standard” Y*, defined as the objective inflection point
between liability and no liability.54 Each dispute has a “true value” Y, defined
as an objective value of the case as would be determined by the deliberative
body based on the facts and the applicable law.55 Each party assesses the
probability of the case. Priest and Klein refine the definition of probability to
mean the evaluation of how the decision standard would be applied to the
unique facts of the dispute.56 Case assessment entails an estimate of the
distance between the decision standard Y* and the true value Y.57 This estimate
is subject to an error variable such that Yi = Y + ε.58 The error variable ε is
normally distributed and random so that “the parties’ expectations are
independent, unbiased, and on average equal to the true value of Y.”59
Building on the standard model, Priest and Klein assume that each party
calculates a settlement value by multiplying the probability of success by the
judgment amount net of transaction costs.60 Litigation occurs when the
plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is greater than the defendant’s maximum
value, which is a restatement of the trial inequality.61
Priest and Klein argue that trial and settlement are not randomly selected.
When the true value Y is far from the decisions standard Y*, settlement is more
likely because the parties are more likely to agree on the probable outcome
even accounting for random error and differences in probabilistic assessment.62
“In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop
out.”63 But when the true value is closer to the decision standard, there is
“more uncertainty as to their outcomes and, thus, more disagreement between
the parties.”64 Their key intuition is that expectations in close cases are more

53

See Priest & Klein, supra note 1; see also George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis:
Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 216–21 (1985) (providing a nonmathematical
explanation of the theory).
54 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 7–8.
55 Id. at 9.
56 Priest, supra note 53, at 217.
57 Id.; Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 10–11.
58 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 9.
59 Id. at 9, 14.
60 Priest, supra note 53, at 217; Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 12–13.
61 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 13.
62 Id. at 14–15.
63 Id. at 17.
64 Id. at 16.
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sensitive to error and differences in probabilistic assessments.65 Slight
differences in the position of the true value Y may mean it is within or outside
of the decision standard Y*. A random error, one way or the other, may tip the
outcome more so than when Y is far from Y*, and thus the parties are more
likely to dispute the expected outcome. Based on this theory, Priest and Klein
also predict that the rate of success for plaintiffs at trial would be close to
50%.66
Under the Priest and Klein selection hypothesis then, the case merit relative
to a fixed decision standard is the key factor that systematically sorts cases for
trial and settlement. As long as the “true value” of the case can be determined
accurately, easy cases in the sense of predictability of outcome settle while
close cases tend toward trial. Thus, uncertainty of outcome promotes trial.67
C. Assumptions of the Standard Model
Economic theory is commonly criticized for unrealistic assumptions.68 But
not all assumptions are cut from the same cloth. This Article distinguishes two
types of assumptions: model assumptions and theory assumptions. Model
assumptions are those that do not always hold in the practical world, but are
nevertheless sufficiently grounded in worldly possibilities that they are
acceptable devices to isolate the noise from complicating variables. They are
made in the spirit of maintaining a uniform set of conditions to analyze or
simplify a problem. Criticism on the grounds that model assumptions do not
reflect reality is muted by the fact that the thought experiment, without worldly
complications, is still valuable in understanding the underlying workings of a
real problem.69 On the other hand, theory assumptions are so fundamental that

65 “Parties are more likely to differ in their expectations of the outcomes of disputes that lie close to the
decision standard—the marginal liability cases—again, regardless of the decision standard itself.” Priest,
supra note 53, at 218.
66 Id. at 218–19; Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 18–19.
67 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 16–17. A stylized numeric example illustrates the point. Let the
decision standard Y* = 0 and liability is some positive number (L > 0). Assume liability is clear and the parties
hold these views: Yp = 10 and Yd = 8. If ε = ± 2, unbiased and normally distributed, the parties’ combined
estimate of the range of “true value” is Y = [6, 12], suggesting liability is still clear even considering the
potential error and differences in probabilistic assessments. Assume now that Yp = 1 and Yd = 0. The case is
much closer and the true value is in the range of Y = [-2, 3]. This range encompasses both liability and no
liability determinations, and so the parties are more likely to dispute the outcome as it is more uncertain.
68 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69 The standard model makes some of these assumptions: the dispute is a two-party, single-play game;
litigants are rational and risk neutral; and they have equal stake in the litigation and symmetric information.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 417–18 & n.27 (underlying assumptions of the standard economic model
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they constitute core elements of the underlying theory. They do not limit the
scope of the thought experiment so much as they are its subject. Criticism of a
theory assumption questions not the method of experimentation but the very
legitimacy of the theory. This Article criticizes the following four theory
assumptions of the standard economic model:
1. The standard model eliminates the relevance of variance of outcome
through an assumption of risk neutrality.70 Under this condition, the concept
of probability incorporates all components of dispute risk. Expected value
captures the uncertainty of litigation, discounting settlement value by
probability.71 Since expected value is weighed against expected transaction
cost, which is subject to reasonable forecasting, probability is objective, both
in the sense of measurability and independence from a party’s subjective
belief. This is consistent with the “rational expectation” model, which “means
that expectations contain no systematic bias, that is, the subjective expectations
correspond to the objective frequencies of the random event.”72 Thus,
probability is typically stated as a statistical frequency, or at least frequency is
a linguistic proxy for the concept.73
2. By assuming a true frequency, the standard model also assumes that the
decision standard of a deliberative body is a fixed point of reference. Priest
and Klein are explicit about this: “[W]e will presume that standards exist for
resolving disputes, and that judges or juries apply specific standards
consistently in disputes of one type or another.”74 The important implication is
that consistent predictability of legal decisions is possible and the parties
should, absent “optimism” or error, discover it upon proper analysis and
assessment of probability.

may not hold in multiparty negotiations); Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 16–17 (assuming information
symmetry and consistent probabilistic assessments).
70 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1076 (“Risk aversion thus increases the surplus . . .
which presumably increases the probability of a settlement.”); Landes, supra note 1, at 67 (risk affinity may
result in litigation for the opportunity to achieve the most optimal result); Shavell, supra note 48, at 57
(assumption of risk neutrality).
71 As Posner explains, “[T]he plaintiff’s net expected gain from litigating is the judgment if he wins
discounted by his estimate of the probability that he will win, minus his litigation costs.” POSNER, supra note
22, at 568.
72 Cooter, supra note 20, at 22.
73 Id.; see Cooter et al., supra note 2, at 233 (“Thus the equilibrium of the game is a situation in which
subjective probabilities correspond to objective frequencies.”).
74 Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 7.
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3. Similarly, the standard model is optimistic as to the predictive powers of
rational parties. Again, Priest and Klein articulate this optimism: “The most
important assumption of the model is that potential litigants form rational
estimates of the likely decision, whether it is based on applicable legal
precedent or judicial or jury bias.”75 In arguing that private bargains should
lead to efficient economic production, Coase also implied the same: “Of
course, if market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of
equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and
the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”76 The assumption is that judicial
proceedings are fairly predictable. Here, two thoughts are distinguished: first,
whether a party can decide a course of action based on a rational belief that her
assessment is accurate under the circumstances and within the limits of human
knowledge; second, whether that probabilistic assessment is accurate. The
standard model answers affirmatively to both queries. Note that without the
assumption that the parties can probabilistically handicap judicial outcomes,
the normative superiority of settlement cannot hold and the resolution of a
dispute is simply a matter of pricing.
4. Transaction cost is synonymous with cost of resolution. It is primarily
the cash or cash equivalent outlays of resolving a claim, e.g., attorneys’ fees,
time and effort. Under this definition, litigation entails substantial transaction
costs,77 whereas settlement cost is assumed to be de minimis. If the cost of
resolution is limited to cash expenditure, this assumption would be reasonable
as litigation costs typically far exceed settlement costs. Under the standard
model, the cost of resolution does not incorporate a broader concept of a riskadjusted cost of resolution that would affect the valuation of the dispute.
These four fundamental assumptions provide the superstructure to the
argument that settlement is normatively superior. The syllogism is: Rational
parties should be able to predict their chances of prevailing on the merits;
expectations should converge toward a fixed decision standard, diminishing
optimism and creating a contract zone; since the transaction cost of litigation is
greater than the zero cost of negotiating a private bargain, settlement is the

75 Id. at 4; see Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1074 (“These hypotheses all build on the view that
cases fail to settle as a consequence of a mistaken prediction about the outcome of a trial made by one of the
parties.”); Priest, supra note 53, at 218 (“We presume that parties or their lawyers are on average accurate in
their evaluations of disputes.”).
76 Coase, supra note 27, at 19 (emphasis added).
77 See, e.g., Trubek et al., supra note 2, at 75 (defining the cost of litigation as the “direct expenditures of
time and money on processing disputes through litigation”); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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more efficient method of dispute resolution; thus, litigation is a wasteful
activity.78 The economic model is as simple as it is elegant, or more precisely,
its elegance lies in its simplicity.79 However, if the above theory assumptions
go beyond the limits of credible tolerance, the model is a flawed vision of the
general system of legal bargaining.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE STANDARD MODEL
A. Theories of Probability
The point from which all arguments depart is that a legal dispute creates
uncertainty: how will a deliberative body decide the case? At the heart of the
conventional cost-benefit analysis is a probabilistic assessment of trial
outcome. Most law and economics literature foregoes a formal definition of
probability and simply assumes it to be a numeric interval between zero and
one.80 But objective probability of legal case assessment is impossible. The
standard model blurs the distinction between matters that are subject to
reasonable measurement, such as expected transaction cost, and those that are
qualitatively judged, such as expected trial results.81 The latter is bounded
only by the plausibility of reasoning and the conclusions drawn may be
contradictory. A comparison of these terms superimposes the empirical rigor
of a standard cost-benefit analysis on the dynamic uncertainties of the
bargaining process.
The concept of probability in legal literature is not new. Perhaps the most
celebrated example is United States v. Carroll Towing, in which Judge Hand
expressed negligence in the algebraic formula P x L > B, where P is
probability of the accident occurring, L is anticipated loss, and B is burden of
precaution.82 Despite its prominence in academic literature, the Hand Formula
is an operationally neutered concept—Judge Hand himself subsequently

78

See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 567–71.
Posner, supra note 1, at 420 (noting the problem of indeterminacy and suggesting a “simple approach”
though it is “none altogether satisfactory”).
80 See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text; POSNER, supra note 22, at 568 (no formal definition of
probability in the context of bargaining theory); Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 10–13 (same).
81 There are two probabilities: the probability of a finding of liability and the probability pertaining to
damages. For simplicity, damages are assumed to be reasonably predictable.
82 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
32–33 (1972) (commenting that the Hand Formula provides an applicable test for the determination of
negligence).
79
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conceded that all attempts to quantify its variables, and particularly probability,
are “illusory.”83 While it is often illustrated in stylized marginal cost
analyses,84 there has been no scholarly attempt to measure in retrospect the
variables in Carroll Towing. Such an exercise would be of great academic
value, if only to show that the formula has operational functionality.85 The
reason for this is simple—even if the accident could have been analyzed ex
ante, no probability would have existed on the chance that a string of six
specific barges, moored together in the manner that they were, would break
loose from the particular ropes used under increasing conditions of wind and
tide on that particular day, and that the specific barge in question, one out of
six set loose from their mooring, would crash into another ship in a manner
that would result in the sinking of that barge.86 The facts surrounding that
accident, like those of most legal disputes, were unique; the relevant class of
comparison is one, of which the outcome is binary (either there is an accident
or there is not). Nor is the problem of indeterminacy solved by inquiring into a
broader foreseeability of risk analysis—whether there could have been an
accident of some sort irrespective of the precise chain of events—as the risk
can only be assessed in a qualitative, judgmental manner.87 Simply put, no ex
ante probability—at least expressed as a frequency—existed. To the extent
that the Hand Formula constitutes a balanced application of the concepts of
foreseeability and risk under the totality of the circumstances standard, the

83 Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (“It follows that all such attempts are illusory, and,
if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any
given situation.”).
84 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 179 (8th ed. 2004) (giving an
example of concept of marginal precautions under the Hand formula); POSNER, supra note 22, at 168 (same).
85 The criticism of immeasurability is not new. See, e.g., DAVID B. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 95 (1992) (“It might be impossible for a statistician to calculate
even the probability of the accident that actually occurred.”); Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s Home Port, in TORTS STORIES 11, 31 n.79 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003) (“The problem of “incommensurability” is not peculiar to the Hand Formula. It is a
standard objection to cost-benefit analysis in any context, and has generated a scholarly literature too
expansive even to summarize here.”). Even the strongest supporters of the Hand Formula admit that in the
final analysis it is nothing but a qualitative multifactor analysis. See POSNER, supra note 22, at 564 (“Of
course, as with the Hand Formula itself, it is rarely possible (or at least efforts are not made) to quantify the
terms. But the formula is valuable even when used qualitatively rather than quantitatively.”); McCarty v.
Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (The Formula “has greater analytic than
operational significance.”).
86 See Gilles, supra note 85, at 12–15 (describing the complex facts surrounding the accident).
87 Foresight into the precise chain of events is not needed for a determination of negligence. See, e.g.,
Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (accident resulting from a complex chain of
events involving collision of ships and subsequent collision with a bridge).
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formula has salvage value.88 But to the extent that it purports to add an
economic rigor to the calculus of negligence, the endeavor is a chimera, a
pretension of objective analysis laden with the subjective views of the
deliberative body.89
The standard model of bargaining suffers from the same problem of
immeasurability. The assumption has been that probability is a numeric
interval,90 or that subjective viewpoints correlate to some objective standard.91
This is consistent with the broader tenor of a cost-benefit analysis. The model
assumes that there is always a probability, and since it is a numeric value it can
be compared against transaction cost to calculate an optimal solution.92 The
problem goes to the heart of the definition and philosophy of probability.
What does probability mean? There are two broad theories, which are
described in the following subsections.
Statistical Probability. Statistical probability is based on empirical
observation of events from which we infer a future event, and its foundation is
based on mathematics.93 It is formally defined as “the limiting value of the

88 This can be seen in the definition of negligence in the Third Restatement of Torts: “Primary factors to
consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that
the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden
of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (Draft 2001).
The Restatement avoids the term “probability” and any concept of algebraic weight. Id. § 3 cmt. e. Comment
e, however, makes clear that the Restatement adopts a “cost-benefit” analysis, where “[c]onduct is negligent if
its disadvantages outweigh its advantages, while conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its
disadvantages.” Id. The comments go on to note that the problem of valuation is difficult to quantify and “the
burden of precaution is intangible in a way that perplexes any effort at quantification.” Id. § 3 cmt. h.
89 See McCarty, 826 F.2d at 1557 (Posner, J.) (suggesting that judgments must be “reasonable,” meaning
“intuiting rather than measuring the factors in the Hand Formula”); cf. Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and
the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145 (2003) (criticizing the Hand Formula and
its perceived importance in the field of tort law).
90 See, e.g., Grundfest & Huang, supra note 12, at 1286 (treating probability as a relative frequency);
Jeffrey O’Connell et al., An Economic Model Costing “Early Offers” Medical Malpractice Reform: Trading
Noneconomic Damages for Prompt Payment of Economic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 259, 284–86 (2005)
(same); Priest & Klein, supra note 1 (same).
91 See supra note 73. Posner and Cooter suggest that probability is subjective. See Cooter, supra note
20, at 22 (probability is “subjective expectations correspond[ing] to the objective frequencies of the random
event”); Posner, supra note 1, at 468 (noting that probability is calculated as each party “estimates it”). Even
when scholars recognize the subjective nature of probability, its implications are not explored. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 55 (1987) (noting
that the utility function depends on “subjective probability” but failing to discuss the implications on tort
theory).
92 See supra Part II.C.
93 M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 4 (1979).
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relative frequency with which some event occurs.”94 John Maynard Keynes
summarized the frequency theory:
The essence of this theory can be expressed in a few words. To
say, that the probability of an event’s having a certain characteristic
is x/y, is to mean that the event is one of a number of events, a
proportion x/y of which have the characteristic in question; and the
fact, that there is such a series of events possessing this frequency in
respect of the characteristic, is purely a matter of experience to be
determined in the same manner as any other question of fact. That
such a series do exist happens to be a characteristic of the real world
as we know it, and from this the practical importance of the
95
calculation of probabilities is derived.

There are two classes of statistical frequency. First is a priori probability.96
In these cases, the true frequency is known in the practical sense.97 The class
of outcomes is discrete and precisely defined, and the distribution of outcomes
is clearly delineated over a large number of experiments. The simplest
example is a coin flip. The second class of probability is “statistical
judgment.”98 This version of probability is based on a posteriori data from
which we infer a true frequency.99 For example, from 1800 to 1802 in France,
110,312 boys and 105,287 girls were born, from which the mathematician
Pierre-Simon Laplace inferred the chance of a boy newborn to be 51.2% as
compared to 48.8% for a girl.100 Thus, probability of a future event is inferred
from judgment based on past experiences.
The reliability of approximation depends on the quality and quantity of data
and their relationship to the premise and conclusion. It is imperative that “the
class must be specified to which the proposition is being referred.”101 In some
cases, the class can be determined narrowly: e.g., sex of newborns, coin flips,
lawsuits filed in federal courts. But in most circumstances in the legal context,
a single datum fits a number of classes. For instance, the number of federal
94

See id.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 94 (1921).
96 A.J. AYER, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 27 (1972).
97 The exact probability of an event is unknowable because we can never replicate or measure the event
to infinity. BULMER, supra note 93, at 5; see SERGIO M. FOCARDI & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF
FINANCIAL MODELING & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 166 (2004) (“If we accept a probability interpretation of
reality, there is no way to leap to certainty.”).
98 AYER, supra note 96, at 27.
99 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 102.
100 BULMER, supra note 93, at 3.
101 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 102.
95

RHEE GALLEYSFINAL

642

3/15/2007 11:52:42 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

lawsuits can be classified into simple subject areas such as specific causes of
action, jurisdictional postures, forum and adjudicatory bodies, remedies
sought, or combinations thereof. Such classifications, however, say little about
the distinctions or similarities between one case and another in the same class.
We can think in such crude approximations as “an ordinary tort case,” “a
securities class action,” or “a commercial contract action,” but what do these
labels actually tell us about the class or each case relative to the class? Or, as
Keynes asked, “[W]hat principle is there for uniquely determining the class,
the truth-frequency of which is to measure the probability of the argument?”102
Consider the possibility that case A belongs to classes C1 and C2, where the
probabilities are x and y, respectively. This suggests the seemingly unsettling
possibility of a single proposition having multiple probabilities. In these cases,
the instinct would be to take the most narrow, specialized class. But no matter
how detailed a class is made to appear in the context of legal proceedings,
experience tells us that there is usually an equally apt alternative class. If the
class is narrowed to the logical end, it approaches the limit of one and the
relevant premise merges with the probability proposition.103 In most inquiries,
the problem of determining the relevant class and defining the premise of the
probability proposition is “insurmountable.”104
Legal actions cannot be described in the narrow, symmetric manner that is
required for measurement. Comparisons of frequencies or their rough
qualitative substitute (prior personal experiences) is impossible due to practical
and theoretical limitations. First, as a practical matter, the civil trial is an
increasingly rare phenomenon and so the adequacy of the supporting data or
experience is called into question.105 Most attorneys and their clients lack
sufficient trial experience to assess the probability of how a deliberative body
would decide. The practice of most civil litigators is geared toward procedural
processing, motions, and settlement positioning, and not toward conducting
trials. What is the premise from which we sketch the class? What is the data

102

Id. at 103.
Id.
104 Id. In the field of evidence, the same problem of determining the relative cases presents itself. See
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models in Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107, 112 (2007) (noting that evidence may be a “member of an infinite number of reference classes, the
boundary conditions of which can be gerrymandered in countless ways”).
105 See Galanter, supra note 7, at 463 tbl.1, 507 tbl.4 (noting that from 1962 to 2002, the trial rate in
federal civil actions declined from 11.5% to 1.8%; from 1976 to 2002 civil trials in twenty-two states declined
from 36.1% to 15.8%).
103
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or experience supporting the proposition? Ten jury trials? Twenty? Thirty?106
How large is this data sample given the uniqueness of each case? To rely on
frequency theory to predict legal decisions at trial would require a large set of
data to support a probabilistic prediction.107
As for the theoretical problem, the facts of any given legal case are unique,
the relevant class is but one, and thus data is nonexistent. Even something as
mundane as the frequency of auto accidents has its limits. We can calculate
the number of cars on the road, car types, driver demographics, drive time,
geography, and frequency of accidents per car. These exercises are rote. Yet,
aggregate frequency says very little about the “true” probability of any given
accident. Consider the following: what is the probability that a 40-year-old
driver, who has been driving since the age of 15 and has a virtually spotless
accident record, would be involved in a serious accident on the 24 mile stretch
of Kansas prairie on I-70 connecting Lawrence to Topeka during the pitch
blackness of an early January morning in the middle of a severe ice storm?
Unless these precise facts are repeated in a series of controlled experiments
under the same or similar conditions, no statistician or actuary can calculate the
probability of a serious accident in this circumstance.108
Actuarial
106 Fred Bartlit, formerly of Kirland & Ellis, is considered one of the best and most experienced civil trial
attorneys in the country. See EMILY COURIC, THE TRIAL LAWYERS: THE NATION’S TOP LITIGATORS TELL
HOW THEY WIN 1–39 (1988). According to the biographical information on his firm’s website, he has tried 50
cases since 1970. Bartlit Beck Website, Fred H. Bartlit, Jr., http://www.bartlit-beck.com/lawyers/partners.asp
(follow “Fred H. Bartlit, Jr.” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
107 Even in such technical fields as aerospace engineering and risk management, the lack of data is an
impediment. In assessing the Space Shuttle Challenger catastrophe, Nobel physicist Richard Feynman noted
that NASA failed to define the appropriate premise for statistical calculations of catastrophic failure rates: “It
is true that if the probability of failure was as low as 1 in 100,000 it would take an inordinate number of tests
to determine it (you would get nothing but a string of perfect flights from which no precise figure, other than
that the probability is likely less than the number of such flights in the string so far).” RICHARD P. FEYNMAN,
CLASSIC FEYNMAN 467 (Ralph Leighton ed., 2006) (reprinting Report of the Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, app. F (Personal Observations on the Reliability of the Shuttle) (Feb. 3,
1986)). Before the shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, NASA estimated a catastrophic failure rate between
1/100 and 1/100,000. Id. Feynman noted in his report to President Reagan that one of the principle causes of
the disaster was NASA’s failure to understand the limitations of a frequency theory of probability. While
NASA relied on a “high degree of mission success,” it ignored previous instances of difficulties and near
accidents. Id. The fundamental problem from the perspective of probability theory was defining the premise:
is the class limited to catastrophic failure or does it include failures not resulting in catastrophe? Even in the
most advanced sciences, statistical frequency is an elusive concept.
108 Telephone Interview with Larry Bruning, Chief Actuary, Kan. Dep’t of Ins. (Nov. 2, 2005). Mr.
Bruning stated that actuarial data is meaningless to the individual probability of any given event. Id. Such an
event has no probability as it occurs within the context of a unique set of facts and the relevant class of
comparison is one. Insurance is only possible because the law of large numbers can be used to measure
frequency with respect to a large group. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 57–60 (2d ed. 2004).
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classifications for car accidents, deaths, and illnesses, are “random mass
phenomenon[s], unpredictable in certain details, predictable in certain
numerical proportions of the whole.”109 While repeat players such as insurers
and corporations can make decisions on the basis of aggregate risk, thus
reducing the variance in a portfolio of lawsuits, an individual disputant cannot
take the same approach because she is only interested in the value of her
single, unique claim.110 Accordingly, frequency theory is a limited concept for
it “excludes a great number of judgments which are generally believed to deal
with probability.”111 But this is not the death knell for probability in legal
assessment.
Inductive Probability. Inductive probability is defined as “the degree of
belief [at] which it is rational to place in a hypothesis or proposition on given
evidence.”112 Probability is a proposition that can have various degrees of
relationship to the corpus of knowledge. The philosopher Alfred Ayer
characterized probability as judgments of credibility: “These are judgments to
the effect that some particular event is likely to happen, or to have happened,
or that one event is more likely to happen than another, though the degree of
probability cannot, or cannot in any obvious way, be given mathematical
expression.”113 Inductive probability is subjective, but subjectivity is not
incompatible with rationality. A proposition is made probable not by mere
belief, but by facts and inferences supporting that belief.114 In the above
example of the probability of a car accident, we may say that the “true”
probability cannot be known (or does not exist), but we may still rationally
believe that the chance of an accident is “significant,” “insubstantial,” or “quite

109

GEORGE PÓLYA, 2 MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING 56 (1968).
See Rhee, supra note 12, at 238–39 (discussing the effect of repeat play on the level of risk-adjusted
discounting in settlement value).
111 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 95. Keynes notes that even the sciences cannot rely in many cases on a
frequency theory, citing Darwin’s theory of evolution as an example. Id. at 108.
112 BULMER, supra note 93, at 5.
113 AYER, supra note 96, at 27–28. Ayer gives the following example:
110

Thus, the judgment which assigns . . . to dying of lung cancer is, as I have said, statistical; but the
judgment that such and such an individual smoker will probably die of lung cancer, if it is
genuinely a judgment about this individual, and not just about the class of smokers to which he
belongs, is a judgment of credibility.
Id. at 28. The physicist Feynman also approached the problem of a catastrophic failure in the Space Shuttle
program in the similar manner of allowing for “engineering judgment.” See supra note 107.
114 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 4. Keynes explained further that “judgments of probability, upon which we
depend for almost all our beliefs in matters of experience, undoubtedly depend on a strong psychological
propensity in us to consider objects in a particular light.” Id. at 52.

RHEE GALLEYSFINAL

2006]

3/15/2007 11:52:42 AM

A PRICE THEORY OF LEGAL BARGAINING

645

high”—terms describing the individual weight of rational feeling toward the
proposition and subject to the imprecision of language.
Statistical probability is a limited concept. In most situations, probability is
a logical, not a mathematical, relationship among premises, facts, inferences,
and conclusions.115 Keynes provided the most vigorous articulation of
inductive probability in A Treatise on Probability. There, he argued that
inductive probability is a logical concept to which there are only “degrees of
rational belief.”116 The inquiry goes to our understanding and perception of
knowledge.
I maintain, then, in what follows, that there are some pairs of
probabilities between the members of which no comparison of
magnitude is possible; that we can say, nevertheless, of some pairs of
relations of probability that the one is greater and the other less,
although it is not possible to measure the difference between them;
and that in a very special type of case . . . a meaning can be given to a
numerical comparison of magnitude.
By saying that not all probabilities are measurable, I mean that it is
not possible to say of every pair of conclusions, about which we have
some knowledge, that the degree of our rational belief in one bears
any numerical relation to the degree of our rational belief in the
other; and by saying that not all probabilities are comparable in
respect of more and less, I mean that it is not always possible to say
that the degree of our rational belief in one conclusion is either equal
117
to, greater than, or less than the degree of our belief in another.

Outside of the special case of mathematical probability, probability is
rooted in philosophy. Early philosophers believed that human experience
provides the grounds for a rational belief that an event will occur.118 The
philosopher David Hume expressed the following sentiment:
Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation.
[It is] not solely in poetry or music, we must follow our taste and
sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am [convinced] of
any principle, [it is] only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon
me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above

115
116
117
118

Id. at 7.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 80.
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another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the
119
superiority of their influence.

Mathematicians sought to replace the philosophical inquiry involving human
sentiment and preferences with an empirical approach favoring objective data
from past experiences, which Keynes noted would “have been a very
astonishing discovery, and would . . . have gradually brought almost every
phase of human activity within the power of the most refined mathematical
analysis.”120 But the aspiration proved too much for the theory, and it was
realized that the frequency theory required “not a wide experience or detailed
information, but a completeness of symmetry in the little information there
might be.”121 Only when the matter was simple—regardless of whether
“balanced ignorance” made it so—could probability be removed from the
realm of human feelings and into cold mathematics.122
B. Probability and Legal Application
Looking to the field of law, Keynes wryly observed that “the lawyers have
been more subtle in this matter than the philosophers.”123 He cited Chaplin v.
Hicks as an example.124 The case arose from a beauty contest involving ten
districts. The contest drew six thousand applications. Five contestants from
each district would be chosen as finalists. The fifty finalists would be
personally interviewed by the defendant, and twelve contestants would then be
119 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 1, pt. 3, § 8, at 103 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1739).
120 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 85. Oliver Wendell Holmes flirted with the idea that in many cases
negligence could ultimately be reduced to mathematics given a sufficient amount of judicial experience in
dealing with accidents:

A judge who has long sat nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which
enables him to represent the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better
than an average jury. . . . But it is obvious that the limit of safety in such cases, supposing no
further elements present, could be determined almost to a foot by mathematical calculations.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111–29 (1881). But see Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental
Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Justice Holmes believed that courts would (at least, should)
slowly reduce all of tort law to objective, readily applied rules. This is not viewed today as one of his more
astute predictions.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Blaak v. Davidson, 529 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Wash. 1975) (“Seldom,
if ever, are the facts and circumstances surrounding a collision the same. Thus, particularly with respect to
automobiles, the propriety of solidifying the law into mechanistic rules for universal application is dubious,
and this legal reasoning or philosophy is clearly on the wane.”).
121 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 85.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 24.
124 2 K.B. 786 (1911).
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declared winners. The plaintiff received the top finalist vote in one of the ten
districts, and so was one of the fifty finalists. Due to a scheduling mistake, the
defendant failed to meet the plaintiff, thus denying her the opportunity to win.
The defendant argued that the cause of action was too speculative, that even if
she had interviewed her chances would have depended on his subjective views
of beauty. The court rejected this argument and affirmed the jury verdict for
the plaintiff. Lord Williams conceded that even accounting for her top
placement in her district, the probability could not be estimated with
reasonable precision.125 Ordinarily market pricing resolves disputes over
value. “Sometimes, however, there is no market for the particular class of
goods; but no one has ever suggested that, because there is no market, there are
not damages.”126 Where there is no competitive market, the law can assign a
value through a reasonable “guesswork” as to what that value may be if such a
claim was traded in a competitive market.127 Thus, “rough justice” was done
in spite of the incalculability of probability.128
Tort law also poses the problem of incommensurable probability. The
burden of persuasion in civil actions is the preponderance of the evidence,
which has been interpreted as a statistical concept of more likely than not.129
But circumstances can test the limit of this concept, particularly in causation
analysis.130 A consistent view of probability, mathematically or inductively
adduced, at times is impossible. For example, in Gardner v. National Bulk
Carriers, Inc., a sailor fell overboard sometime within a five and a half hour
window.131 Since the captain did not attempt a rescue, causation was an
epistemological enigma. Noting “large number of successes” in rescue of
sailors even long after they had been in the water, the court could only
125

Id. at 791.
Id. at 792. Lord Moulton also noted the problem of “market pricing.” Id. at 795–96.
127 Id. at 792–93. Lord Farwell gave some weight to the fact that the plaintiff placed first in the semifinal
balloting. Id. at 798–99.
128 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 27.
129 See Rhee, supra note 30, at 141 (“Courts dogmatically have adhered to the 51% preponderance
concept, stating it in such precise mathematical terms, as if expert testimonies between ‘equal chance’ and
‘more likely than not’ have any meaningful distinction in these cases beyond the artful.”); see, e.g., Davis v. P.
Gambardella & Son Cheese Corp., 161 A.2d 583, 587 (Conn. 1960) (testimony of fifty–fifty chance held to be
insufficient because an even chance is said to be a possibility and not a probability), overruled by Petriello v.
Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding
that fifty–fifty chance of future injury failed to meet reasonable certainty standard).
130 Sometimes, it is a mathematical certainty that the preponderance of the evidence standard cannot be
met although justice requires a remedy. This was the situation in the celebrated case of Summers v. Tice, 199
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), where two hunters each fired shotguns in the direction of the plaintiff, resulting in injury.
131 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962).
126
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conclude that the ship’s master was negligent by not pursuing “a reasonable
possibility of rescue.”132 Under the circumstances of these “uncertain fact[s],”
the burden of the risk of inaction falls on the master and not the sailor.133 The
jury was allowed to hear the evidence and form a rational belief on causation.
The practical effect of this rule of law is that some cases will result in liability
while others will not: There will be uncertainty in the individual case and thus
no guarantee of individual justice, but over time aggregate justice will be
done.134
Another example of the law’s treatment of probability is Haft v. Lone Palm
Hotel.135 In that case, the question was whether the failure to post a warning
sign in a swimming pool, in violation of regulations, could have caused the
plaintiff’s drowning. Causation, a probabilistic analysis, was impossible to
determine in a credible fashion. If causation cannot be established by a
preponderance of the evidence as a part of a prima facie case, the plaintiff
loses. The court held that in this situation, the burden shifted to the defendant
to show that the failure to warn did not cause the harm.136 The ruling attempts
to reconcile a lack of probability with legal policy.137 Cases like Haft pose the
problem of a “recurring miss,” in which each individual case is uncertain as to
the probability, but in the aggregate accidents occur. For example, over many
iterations a failure to warn will in fact cause some hotel guests to drown, but
there will be no way to predict which specific iteration will cause harm.138
Stated differently, the legal problem concerned the reconciliation of
uncertainty in each unique case with a “random mass phenomenon.” By
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the court allowed the jury to form
a rational belief about the probability of causation.139
In each case, the court recognized that statistical probability did not exist.
What was the probability that the beauty contestant would have been selected
132

Id. at 286 n.2, 287.
Id. at 288.
134 See Rhee, supra note 30, at 162 (“Society expects not correct individualized results—the primary
concern of corrective justice theorists in this field—but a fair process that achieves overall corrective justice
for plaintiffs and deterrence for defendants.”).
135 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970).
136 Id. at 469.
137 See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
691, 705–10 (1990).
138 Id. at 706; see Rhee, supra note 30, at 5 (increased risk should be compensated because it decreases a
person’s valuation).
139 Levmore explains the decision as the court’s desire to reach an aggregate probabilistic outcome that
does justice on a grander scale. Levmore, supra note 137, at 708.
133
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on the basis of her beauty? What were the odds that the sailor could have been
saved? What was the chance that the motel guests would not have drowned?
Albeit immeasurable, the probabilities were seen as less remote, lying in that
spectrum of possibilities where educated speculation or conjecture is allowed,
and therefore worthy of jury consideration.140 In the absence of market
pricing, juries were the ultimate arbiters of valuational uncertainty. The
determinations of liability are subject to their rational, subjective beliefs.
Interestingly, when mathematicians considered the application of
probability to legal actions, they rejected the notion that statistical probability
could apply or that such probability was measurable. George Pólya examined
the ways in which deliberative bodies construe the same facts and evidence:
Two people presented with the same evidence may judge it very
differently. Two jurors who sat through the same proceedings may
disagree: one thinks that the evidence introduced is sufficient proof
against the defendant and the other thinks that it is not. Such
disagreement may have [a] thousand different grounds: people may
be moved in opposite directions by fears, hopes, prejudices and
sympathies, or by personal differences. Perhaps, one of the jurors is
stupid and the other is clever, or one slept through the proceedings
and the other listened intently. Yet the personal differences
underlying the disagreement may be more subtle. Perhaps both
jurors are honest and reasonably unprejudiced, both followed the
proceedings with attention, and both are intelligent, but in a different
way. The first juror may be a better observer of demeanor. He
observes the facial expressions of the witnesses, the tics of the
defendant; he notices when an answer is haltingly given; he is
impressed by quick motions of the eyes and little gestures of the
hands. The other juror may be a less skillful observer of facial
expressions, but a better judge of social relations: he understands
better the milieu and the circumstances of the people involved in the
case. Seeing the same things with different eyes, honestly and not
141
unintelligently, the two jurors come to opposite conclusions.

Because there is no way to model human intelligence at work in the legal
process, Pólya believed that patterns of plausible inference may rationally
diverge in probability analysis.142 Below is Michael Bulmer’s opinion on the
subject:
140

See infra note 228.
PÓLYA, supra note 109, at 110.
142 Id. at 111 (“[T]wo persons presented with the same evidence and applying the same patterns of
plausible inference may honestly disagree.”).
141
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In a civil action, on the other hand, the jury, if there is one, will find
for the party which they consider to have the higher probability of
being correct in its assertions. The probability which it is the
function of the jury to assess is clearly not a statistical probability;
for each trial is unique and cannot be considered as one out of a large
number of similar trials. What the jury does is to decide, after
hearing the evidence, what, as reasonable men, they ought to believe
143
and with what strength they should hold that belief.

Finally, Keynes was skeptical of the notion that legal probabilities could be
reduced to some empirical concept, divorced from the feelings of the parties.
How does the matter stand, then? Whether or not such a thing is
theoretically conceivable, no exercise of the practical judgment is
possible, by which a numerical value can actually be given to the
probability of every argument. So far from our being able to measure
them, it is not even clear that we are always able to place them in an
order of magnitude. Nor has any theoretical rule for their evaluation
ever been suggested.
The doubt, in view of these facts, whether any two probabilities are
in every case even theoretically capable of comparison in terms of
numbers, has not, however, received serious consideration. There
seems to me to be exceedingly strong reasons for entertaining the
144
doubt.

These observations are obvious but worth emphasizing. Legal probability
is immeasurable, indeterminate, and subjective. Yet law and economics
literature models probability as an empirical concept to be treated in the same
class as cash expenditure of transaction cost, which is quantifiable and subject
to reasonable forecasting. This flawed assumption creates an insurmountable
problem of compatibility. Probability can only be assessed in a qualitative
manner, with imprecise language as the only medium of communicating
complex sentiments and thoughts. Thus proposition A is said to be more likely
than proposition B, though it may not be known by how much or precisely why
one feels this way. Legal probability is not empirical in the sense of frequency
of a discrete, narrowly defined, repeating event; it is empirical in the sense that
it is formed on “beliefs that we cannot strictly prove but to which we attribute
various degrees of likelihood.”145

143
144
145

BULMER, supra note 93, at 6.
KEYNES, supra note 95, at 27–28.
FOCARDI & FABOZZI, supra note 97, at 166.
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In addition to relying on a faulty concept of probability, the standard
economic model also views probability in the singular. However, if multiple
probabilities can coexist, widely divergent views on probability are rational.
Again, Keynes dealt with this problem:
Some sets of probabilities we can place in an ordered series, in which
we can say of any pair that one is nearer than the other to certainty,—
that the argument in one case is nearer proof than in the other, and
that there is more reason for one conclusion than for the other. But
we can only build up these ordered series in special cases. If we are
given two distinct arguments, there is no general presumption that
146
their two probabilities and certainty can be placed in an order.

The problem of multiple probabilities is seen in Laidlaw v. Sage.147 There,
the defendant physically moved the plaintiff in front of him, using the plaintiff
as a human shield against an assailant with a bomb. The plaintiff was unaware
of the deadly situation and was injured when the bomb exploded. The
defendant testified that he never touched the plaintiff before the explosion, thus
factually contesting an essential element of the tort of battery;148 but he also
testified that he did nothing unconsciously, spontaneously, or without
deliberation, thus supporting plaintiff’s factual theory of an intentional act.149
The defense’s theories were: (1) no physical contact occurred and so no battery
could have occurred (factual argument); (2) even if contact occurred, there was
no battery as a matter of law because the act was in furtherance of selfpreservation (legal argument). This case illustrates the possibility of multiple
probabilities in any given case. How can the probabilities of the legal
argument be weighed against the factual argument? The nature, reasoning, and
methods of these arguments are entirely different. The parties had divergent,
but rational beliefs about them. These beliefs cannot be ranked in an ordered
series and given comparative weight. It would be tempting to analyze these
arguments as an “if-then” decision tree and calculate conditional probabilities.
Let P(f) and P(l) be the probabilities of the defendant prevailing on the factual
and legal arguments such that: Pd = P(f) + (1 − P(f)) x P(l), and Pp = (1 −
P(f)) x (1 − P(l)) where Pd + Pp = 1. Do we believe that deliberative bodies,
explicitly or implicitly, think in such linear terms? Do we trust the accuracy of
146

KEYNES, supra note 95, at 37–38.
52 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1899).
148 Id. at 682; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965) (defining harmful and offensive
contact).
149 Laidlaw, 52 N.E. at 685; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining the element of
intent).
147
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these calculations? Or do they provide a false sense of empirical rigor? Such
inquiry limits the analysis to narrow parameters, amounting to deliberate
ignorance of the complexities of a true probabilistic analysis. For instance, the
conditional probability analysis fails to consider the covariance of the factual
and legal arguments in the deliberative process, the interplay between the
strengths of facts, legal arguments, and liability. The influences of these
factors are real, suggesting that the calculation of probabilities is not a single
parameter function, but instead entails a whole host of factors that would be
impossible to capture in an objective analysis.
The workings of intelligence do not fit any notion of symmetry150 and only
“balanced ignorance” can produce the desired calculation. Case theories may
not exist in one plane of “truth.” Cases like Laidlaw, while unique in facts, are
common in that they have multiple probabilities based on competing or
complementary planes of legal theory and factual contention.151 It would be
difficult to rank the arguments in an ordered series. Most cases are subject to
multivariate decision-making processes in which there are various paths to
resolution without the decisions falling into the realm of reversible error.152

150

Pólya discussed the nature of plausible reasoning, a distinctly asymmetric and human form of
intelligence.
From the outset it was clear that the two kinds of reasoning have different tasks. From the outset
they appeared very different: demonstrative reasoning as definite, final, “machinelike”; and
plausible reasoning as vague, provisional, specifically “human.” Now we may see the difference
a little more distinctly. In opposition to demonstrative inference, plausible inference leaves
indeterminate a highly relevant point: the “strength” or the “weight” of the conclusion. This
weight may depend not only on clarified grounds such as those expressed in the premises, but
also on unclarified unexpressed grounds somewhere in the background of the person who draws
the conclusion. A person has a background, a machine has not. Indeed, you can build a machine
to draw demonstrative conclusions for you, but I think you can never build a machine that will
draw plausible inferences.
PÓLYA, supra note 109, at 115–16.
151 Laidlaw was tried and appealed four times in the New York trial and appellate courts. 52 N.E. at 682.
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that the “law presumes that an act or omission done or neglected under
influence of pressing danger was done or neglected involuntarily.” Id. at 685 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This rule is based on the “maxim that self-preservation is the first law of nature.” Id. Although the
ruling is certainly plausible, it is equally plausible that self-preservation should come with the price that those
injured in the pursuit of this right should be compensated as in the case of necessity. See Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221 (Minn. 1910) (indicating that a plaintiff under extreme distress may still be
liable for injury done to a defendant’s property).
152 See Rhee, supra note 30, at 157 (“Under this view, reversible error can be understood to occur when a
deliberative body arbitrarily increases the general risk of a litigant beyond the range of rational multivariate
decision-making.”).
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Probability then can be no more than the ex ante degrees of rational belief in
the plausibility of these decision paths, irrespective of the ex post result.
C. Weight, Variance, and Confidence
The standard model assumes that probability captures the risks associated
with the dispute and appropriately discounts value. Probability defines the
relation between the premise and known facts. It gauges rational belief at any
given period, but does not measure how that belief may change over time or
the confidence attributed to it. As more facts are disclosed, probability may
move up or down, but the weight of the relevant evidence always increases.
Keynes distinguished the two concepts as this: “The weight, to speak
metaphorically, measures the sum of the favourable and unfavourable
evidence, the probability measures the difference.”153 This Article modifies
Keynes’s definition: Weight W is the ratio of known information to knowable
information as perceived by the parties. In any given dispute, there is
imperfect information because (1) certain information is unknowable or
unpredictable despite the best efforts of the parties (e.g., the decision standard
of the deliberative body),154 or (2) there is information asymmetry or
undiscovered information.
Imperfect information constitutes the
uncertainty.155 Thus, weight is a key factor of dispute risk.
The following hypothetical illustrates the difference between probability
and weight.156 Plaintiff went into defendant’s hospital for a simple
appendectomy and came out of surgery comatose. The coma was induced
when she vomited into the breathing tube and suffered brain damage from
asphyxiation. Because discovery has yet to begin, there is little factual
development. The plaintiff’s attorney undertakes the representation because he
thinks: The damages are significant and a comatose plaintiff would engender
great sympathy. I have a decent chance of winning this case at trial if it goes
that far, and besides, there’s a good chance that the defendant will settle. But
I have to consider that the hospital has a powerful presence in this community
and a good record of defending medical malpractice cases. The lawyer’s

153

KEYNES, supra note 95, at 77.
The decision standard is the collective predispositions, life experiences, and unknown dynamics
among people, all of which combine to apply the given law and weigh the presented facts.
155 See infra Part IV.C; see also Bebchuk, supra note 38 (discussing the problem of imperfect
information).
156 This hypothetical is derived from the film The Verdict (20th Century Fox 1982) (based on BARRY C.
REED, THE VERDICT (1980)).
154
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assessment is rational. Probability derives from the logical connections among
known facts. Under the notice pleading doctrine, a plaintiff is not required to
investigate a claim in great detail.157 There is a limit to private investigation
without the force of law or mutual cooperation and, therefore, the discovery
process is seen as the primary method to investigate facts. At the start of any
case, there is significant uncertainty. The attorney knows only that plaintiff
went into a routine surgery and came out horribly injured, an event giving rise
to a suspicion of negligence.158 If pushed for the probability of a favorable
outcome, perhaps this attorney may reasonably say “fifty–fifty,”159 not in the
sense that the frequency is 50%, but that one proposition seems just as good as
the other.160
Note that an unknown cannot influence probability and so it is irrelevant to
an analysis of probability. In other words, if λ represents the anticipated
influence of an unknown fact, then P = λ · P. Probability cannot change even
as the parties understand that there are unknown facts that may influence the
case. Probability is derived from the relationship among known facts and is
independent of weight. There is an important implication here: Because the
concept of probability cannot account for weight, the standard model implies
that weight is irrelevant.161 Accordingly, the sooner the settlement, the greater
is the potential economic benefit. As we will see, this implication cannot hold.
Weight is important because it affects the perception of variance, defined as
the degree of deviation of outcome from expectation. Unless a matter is
certain, every forecast has a margin of error.162 It would be foolish to believe
that one’s best forecast would always be correct. Thus, the smaller this
margin, the more one is confident in one’s forecast. The measure of
157 The rules of procedure require attorneys to have conducted “an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Notice pleading practice only requires that the complaint be a “short
and plain statement of the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
158 Cf. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (complication resulting from an unusual injury after
routine surgery gave rise to res ipsa loquitor when multiple medical professionals were involved in treatment
of patient).
159 Lawyers would be “wise to refrain from issuing advice in such quantitative terms.” Detlev F. Vagts,
Legal Opinions in Quantitative Terms: The Lawyer as Haruspex or Bookie?, 34 BUS. LAW. 421, 428 (1979).
Indeed, most lawyers do not quantify the chances of success. Id. at 422–23.
160 The response would be consistent with the statistical “Principle of Indifference, which states that two
events are equally probable if we have no reason to suppose that one of them will happen rather than the
other.” BULMER, supra note 93, at 8.
161 In the standard formulation, V = P x J ± T, there is no term that accounts for the influence of variance.
See supra Section II.C.
162 In statistics, a confidence interval of a probability can be calculated to determine a margin of error.
See infra notes 165–69.
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confidence in one’s expectation is variance. The concepts of probability and
confidence are sometimes confused. For example, in ordinary speech, when a
person says, “I’m 99% sure of proposition X,” there are two potential
meanings: (1) “If the event were to repeat 100 times, I believe that X will
occur 99 times,” or (2) “I believe more likely than not that X will occur and
I’m very confident of my prediction.” The former is a comment on
probability, and the latter is really a statement of confidence. Thus, probability
and confidence are distinct.
The importance of confidence cannot be underestimated. In the context of
investment, confidence is a factor of economic decision making. In his
landmark economic treatise, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money, Keynes noted that in the macroeconomic context, investment decisions
are affected not only by forecasts of prospective yield, but also the state of
confidence in those forecasts: “If we expect large changes but are very
uncertain as to what precise form these changes will take, then our confidence
will be weak.”163 Because attaching great weight to uncertain matters would
be “foolish,” the capital investment rate “depends on the confidence with
which we make this forecast [return]—on how highly we rate the likelihood of
our best forecast turning out quite wrong.”164
In the hypothetical negligence case above, consider how the level of
confidence would affect decision making. We first ask: how much variance
can we expect from the expectation of the initial case assessment of probability
to the ultimate outcome? “Quite high” must be the answer because the case
would be highly sensitive to new information. The attorney cannot be
confident in his “fifty–fifty” assessment. This lack of confidence has practical
implication on settlement. Assume that medical malpractice cases involving
asphyxiation during anesthesia are common and that data on damages is
plentiful. For simplicity of analysis and communication, assume that a finding
of liability would result in expected damages of $2 million and that probability
is measured as a numeric value between 0 and 1. Both parties independently
assess the chance of plaintiff winning at 40%. Transaction cost for trial would
be $200,000 for each party, and the attorneys’ fees are payable regardless of
the result. The standard economic model prescribes that the rational choice is
to settle. Plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is Vp = $2 million x 40% −
$200,000 = $600,000. Defendant’s maximum settlement value is Vd = $2
163
164

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 148 (1962).
Id.
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million x 40% + $200,000 = $1 million. The contract zone is $400,000,
suggesting an excellent possibility of settlement.165 Equitable settlement
suggests a value of $800,000. In practice, is settlement this simple? Before
answering this question, we further assume the improbable: The parties agree
on the basic drivers of settlement valuation; they act rationally and without
emotional noise; they refrain from gamesmanship that jeopardizes settlement;
and agency cost is zero.166 The standard model suggests that settlement is the
only rational choice. The parties’ probabilities converged, and they hold an
identical view of the case. Even under these implausible conditions, however,
would the parties settle early in practice or in theory? “No” must be the
answer. Foregoing settlement is the only rational choice. This answer may
surprise some, but the reason lies with uncertainty. From the defendant’s
perspective, it is difficult to write a check for as much as $1 million upon the
filing of a complaint even if repeat play consideration is not an issue. Potential
liability may be high, but the hospital may have a viable defense as yet
unknown. Since the unknown cannot influence probability, the standard model
fails to account for uncertainty. Although there is a probability (of the
inductive kind), the weight here cannot justify a rational valuation. From the
plaintiff’s perspective, any substantial offer would be enticing. Subjective
heuristics may result in an acceptance to “lock in” a gain.167 But acceptance
may result in leaving money on the table, a common fear among all parties in a
negotiation. The offer must be either fair or unfair, but there is little factual
support for a reasoned distinction. Settlement is a speculative gamble because
it is unsupported by an adequate valuation. Thus, there is an option value of
litigation that must be considered.
Foregoing settlement is contrary to the prescription of the economic model,
which says that settlement is imperative upon an agreed assessment, existence
of transaction cost surplus, and minimization of strategic and behavioral
barriers to settlement. With the assumption of risk neutrality, probability
outcome is the only relevant consideration and variance of outcome matters
165 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 567 (“Perhaps the best guess is that the larger the settlement range the
likelier a settlement is, but the longer the negotiation of the settlement is likely to take.”).
166 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (discussing agency as playing a beneficial role
in resolving disputes); Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 348–52; Johnson, supra note 25, at 568–69
(describing the incentives of attorneys under various fee arrangements); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency
Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 194–95 (1987).
167 This sentiment is consistent with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s theory that people are risk
averse as to locking in gains and risk seeking in avoiding losses. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 23.
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not.168 But the uneasiness we feel is related to weight. At this stage in the
litigation, the parties should not settle in theory and would not settle in practice
because the underlying variance of the case is too great. While the parties may
have assessed probability, confidence in that assessment is low due in part to
low weight and high variance. Speculation—a proposition without sufficient
basis in information—is not desirable in a decision process. Thus, confidence
is independent of probability, correlated with variance, and dependent on
weight.
Continuing the hypothetical, assume that plaintiff can leverage her position
by betting on her case with a bookmaker at 2–3 odds.169 With a $400,000 bet
she can win $600,000 if she wins her case, thus leveraging her litigation
position.170 (We ignore the obvious problems of moral hazard, attorney ethics,
and contract enforceability, as well as the impossibility of creating gaming
odds of legal actions where a party partly controls the game outcome absent
pari-mutuel betting among a group of gamblers.) The plaintiff’s range of
payoffs increases from [$1.8 million, −$200,000] to [$2.4 million, −$600,000].
Is this strategy rational? “No” must be the answer. It is not because she
increased her risk exposure, for this is simply her risk preference, but rather
because this risk exposure was assumed speculatively. The uncertainty is great
enough that no rational person would leverage or hedge the position by placing
a bet on the outcome of the litigation with a third-party bookmaker outside of
the utility of gambling. If a bet is to be made at all, it must be in furtherance of
value maximization and not speculation.171 As Nobel laureate Harry
Markowitz observed in his seminal article Portfolio Selection, most investors
consider “yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad thing; gambling, to be

168

For example, it is irrelevant for the purposes of settlement whether a lawsuit is expected to yield binary
judgments of [51, 49] or [100, 0], since the expected value is the same 50. Obviously, in the practical world,
this difference would matter greatly as the former is virtually a certain result and the latter is a risky outcome.
169 Leveraging a position describes the accumulation of a significant risk without appropriate hedging.
See Rhee, supra note 30, at 133–34 n.107. On the other hand, hedging eliminates or minimizes the exposure
to a specific risk by offsetting any downward movement of that risk with a matching upward movement in
another financial instrument.
170 By taking this bet, plaintiff would essentially engage in a derivative transaction in which she leverages
(or increases) the risk of the underlying asset, i.e., the litigation. See generally JOHN C. COX & MARK
RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS (1985); JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (5th ed.
2002).
171 Simple risk management techniques can be applied to reduce the variance of outcome while
maintaining the expected value. See Rhee, supra note 12, at 202–04 (arguing that risk mitigation enhances the
asset value of a lawsuit).
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avoided.”172 Since the plaintiff’s bet would be speculative, a rational attorney
could not advise it.
Assume now that litigation advances through discovery. Weight increases
substantially. Plaintiff still assesses a 40% chance of winning a $2 million
judgment and this view is now “reasonably firm.” If the plaintiff loses, she
should be liable for attorneys’ fees of $200,000, a more likely than not
expected event. She has an option of pursuing an unhedged position or a
hedged strategy to mitigate downside risk. Without a hedge, the payout is still
[$1.8 million, −$200,000] with a net expected value of $600,000. A hedge can
reduce the risk to the original neutral position of no loss. The plaintiff could
place a $300,000 bet against her case on 3–2 odds: if she wins her case, she
gains $1.8 million net of attorneys’ fees, less $300,000 in hedging loss for a
total yield of $1.5 million; if she loses her case, she incurs attorneys’ fees of
$200,000, which are offset by a hedging gain of $200,000 for a net zero. The
range of payouts is [$1.5 million, $0]. The hedged position still has the same
expected value of $600,000 but provides insurance against downside risk by
decreasing the variance of return. Under these conditions, would the plaintiff
be rational in hedging? “Yes” must be the answer. In effect, she bought a put
option to protect against a decline in the value of the underlying asset (the
lawsuit).173 Since the hedged strategy reduces variance of cash flow, and thus
reducing risk, it is superior even though the expected values may be the same.
Under an expected value analysis, there is no difference between the valuation
at the beginning of the case, the unhedged valuation at the end discovery, and
the hedged valuation. It is indifferent to differences in risk profiles. Expected
value assesses a probabilistic quantity of a cash flow, but importantly does not
assess the quality of the cash flow.174
Probability and weight are independent, which is to say that their
movements are uncorrelated. Weight rises with every disclosure of relevant
evidence, while probability may rise or fall independently.175 Yet there is
confusion in the legal literature on this point. Consider Posner’s explanation
for the timing of settlements.

172 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 91 (1952); see KEYNES, supra note 163, at 148 (“It
would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain.”).
173 A put option is the right, but not the obligation, to sell an asset at a fixed price before the expiration of
the option. See COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 170, at 3.
174 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 202–04 (assessing the quality of an expected cash flow is critical to an
asset pricing model of valuation).
175 KEYNES, supra note 95, at 72.
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A final question about settlement is, when does it occur? It can be
at any time in the course of a legal dispute, including before suit is
filed and after judgment is rendered by the trial court. Many cases in
fact are settled on the eve of trial. It might seem that the probability
of settlement would rise as a lawsuit progressed through pretrial
discovery and other preparatory stages and on into trial, because the
parties would be obtaining more and more information about the
likely outcome at trial and therefore their estimates of that outcome
would be more and more convergent. But this ignores the fact that as
a lawsuit progresses, the incremental cost of litigation versus
settlement declines. So, on the one hand, the perceived benefits of
litigation are declining (those being a function of the parties’ mutual
optimism, which should decrease as they learn more about the case),
but, on the other hand, so are the costs—if sunk costs are ignored, as
176
rational persons will do.

This explanation exposes the conceptual limits of the standard model. It
suggests that litigation incentivizes continued litigation. Spent transaction
costs are sunk costs and thus irrelevant.177 Continued litigation reduces
transaction cost relative to the stake; all else being equal, it follows that
continued litigation should reduce the incentive for settlement.178 With the
assumption of risk neutrality, the prediction would be that continued litigation
would yield many trials. But we know from experience that continued
litigation ultimately leads to many settlements. Posner explains this anomaly
by suggesting that the probability delta (Pp − Pd) also becomes smaller due to
increased information resulting from litigation. However, this explanation is
too convenient. It assumes a single “true” probability that remains to be
discovered by the parties as their assessments become “more and more
convergent.” This analysis confuses the distinction between weight and
probability. Increasing weight does not necessarily produce convergence of
probability. The intensity of divergent beliefs may rationally strengthen with
increased weight.179 Convergence is a theory assumption that fails to reflect
176

POSNER, supra note 22, at 574.
See supra note 5.
178 See Wittman, supra note 39, at 320 (“The choice between a settlement and a trial depends not upon
sunken costs but only upon future costs not yet incurred.”).
179 The empirical evidence supports the phenomenon of divergence. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A.
Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 450 (1988) (presenting empirical findings
that suggest “lawyers tended to be overconfident, in general, but especially so in cases in which they initially
made highly confident predictions” and suggesting a “range of human inferential shortcomings”); George
Lowenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (2004) (“[S]hared information, if open to multiple interpretations, is likely to be
interpreted egocentrically by the disputants, which can cause beliefs to diverge rather than converge.”); cf.
177
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the malleability of rational belief and the complexities of human intelligence at
work.
The suggestion here is not that there is no correlation between perceptions
of the direction of relevant evidence. Even agreement or noncontradiction as
to direction of the evidence need not lead to convergence of belief. For
example, a plaintiff may depose a witness and conclude afterwards that the
deposition was “very helpful,” while the defendant, listening to the same
deposition, may think it was “slightly detrimental” or “neutral.” In most cases
there is no single, objective weight to a piece of evidence. The weight is
always contextual, and it is not necessarily a zero sum proposition. Even if the
general direction of the evidence is perceived to be the same or nonconflicting,
variance of interpretation and effect on case theory play a significant role. The
application of legal evidence always has a number of possibilities. Over a
period of time, the difference in shades of beliefs, even if directionally
consistent, may produce significant divergence as the sum product of total
weight.
A simple stylized experiment illustrates this point. Assume an arbitrary
starting point measurement of 0. Forty different pieces of evidence are
introduced at forty discrete time periods. With each disclosure, one party
views the evidence as “strongly favorable,” “favorable,” or “neutral,” and
arbitrary numbers 2, 1, and 0 are assigned to these terms for pro forma
measurement purposes. The opposing party also views the same piece of
evidence as “strongly unfavorable,” “unfavorable,” or “neutral,” and numbers
are assigned 2, 1, and 0. If one party views a piece of evidence as “strongly
favorable” and the other views it as “strongly unfavorable,” there is perfect
interpretive correlation. Each party would then receive 2 points, and so their
assessments would remain the same. Under these conditions, the greatest
divergence of view on any evidence is “strongly (un)favorable” to “neutral.”
The views are randomly selected by an equal probability, random number
function. Even under this condition of high interpretive correlation, disparities
of assessment as measured by the aggregate number appear frequently. At
times, the assessments closely track each other, but at other times there are
significant divergences. Granted these figures are arbitrary, but this simple

KEYNES, supra note 95, at 171 (“[T]he evidentiary weight of an argument rises, though its probability may rise
or fall, with every accession of relevant evidence.”); PÓLYA, supra note 109, at 111 (“[T]wo persons presented
with the same evidence and applying the same patterns of plausible inference may honestly disagree.”).
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example shows that assessments can diverge even as information is interpreted
in a nonconflicting manner by opposing parties.
Furthermore, consider the complicating phenomenon that rational parties
may actually disagree on both impact and direction of evidence. While it is
true that convergence occurs, perhaps with some frequency, divergence is also
common in contested actions. In many cases, there is not simply one plausible
theory of the case. If evidence is contextual, it may be construed in an
egocentric way. This may not be as irrational as it seems. A dispute is a battle
of ideas, and since the decision of the deliberative body is unpredictable,
holding an egocentric view is consistent with the rational condition of selfinterest. After all, in an adversarial contest, why should a party interpret an
ambiguous piece of evidence against one’s case when it could be interpreted in
one’s favor? The ambiguity of interpretation would factor into one’s
confidence in the proposition, but unnecessary concessions of argument would
not be expected of rational parties. It is unclear whether convergence or
divergence is the underlying cause of settlement or trial. We can safely
assume that convergence is not uncommon and that settlements occur in many
cases because of it, but beyond this obvious point it is conjecture to suggest
that convergence is the primary reason for the high level of observed
settlements in practice, particularly in the later stages when the incentive of
transaction cost savings is diminished with the accumulation of sunk costs. In
any given case, the “random walk” of a dispute may lead to substantial
divergence of probability assessment between rational parties.
D. Random Walk Down Litigation Lane
The above hypothetical case assumes that risk hedging or leveraging
strategies are available. If legal assessment could be reduced to measurable
probabilities, we would expect an active gaming market. But even though
such oddities as political and military events are wagered on, a gaming market
in legal proceedings does not exist. Even if betting was legal, the
overwhelming majority of actions would be ill-suited for wagering. The
reasons are fairly obvious. Litigants may engage in “insider trading” by
undermining their cases for profit or otherwise rigging the bet. Information is
opaque, variables are practically unlimited, and the nature of uncertainty
cannot be captured in the simplistic terms needed for gaming. Even the simple
task of defining the triggering contingency is elusive in litigation; questions
like “who won” and “by how much” are not always easy to answer.
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Collectively, these uncertainties and risks are too variable, indeterminate, and
subjective.
The standard model assumes a fixed decision standard.180 Judged against
this fixed point is probability. If the parties cannot settle, it is deemed that one
or more are optimistic.181 The problem is that the decision standard can never
be known ex ante. In a market, buyers and sellers set the price, and in an
efficient market the price has a tendency to track intrinsic value, though that
value is difficult to ascertain. Although parties may hold rational yet divergent
views on value, they also recognize that future prices cannot be consistently
predicted. What will Microsoft’s stock price be in two years? Will the price
of oil rise or fall? Will a jury be persuaded by the case theory? We can make
rational estimates of a range of values based on generally accepted pricing
convention, but we recognize that there is no goose that lays the golden egg—
no assurance that the application of any pricing technique will predict the
indeterminate future. Economic research dating back to 1900 by Louis
Bachelier has shown that “the market, the aggregate of speculators, at a given
instant can believe in neither a market rise nor a market fall, since, for each
quoted price, there are as many buyers as sellers.”182 All subsequent research
has shown that individual market participants cannot predict future market
prices relative to the expected market return, despite the vast wealth of public
data.183
When the public markets attempt to assess legal outcomes, the results are
not any better. In study of the Texaco–Pennzoil litigation, David Cutler and
Lawrence Summers observed that Pennzoil’s value gained only one-sixth of
Texaco’s loss and so there was net wealth loss of $3.4 billion where one would

180

See supra Part II.C.
See supra note 46.
182 PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 20–21
(1992) (quoting LOUIS BACHELIER, THE THEORY OF SPECULATION 26 (1900)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
183 See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 34 (1965) (“[T]he future
path of the price level of a security is no more predictable than the path of a series of cumulated random
numbers.”); M.G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series—Part I: Prices, 116 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y
11, 11 (1953) (“In a series of prices which are observed at fairly close intervals the random changes from one
term to the next are so large as to swamp any systematic effect which may be present. The data behave almost
like wandering series.”); Holbrook Working, A Random-Difference Series for Use in the Analysis of Time
Series, 29 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 11, 12 (1934) (Subsequent changes in wheat prices are “largely random and
unpredictable.”).
181
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expect neither net loss nor net gain.184 The litigation was of public record,
followed by a wide audience, with no indication of asymmetric information.185
Even under these conditions, however, the “market inefficiently valued the
claims of the two companies.”186 The unpredictability of legal action created a
cost of financial distress to Texaco, which increased Texaco’s discount rate
reflecting its cost of capital. This cost of uncertainty resulted in value leakage
to Texaco that could not be captured by Pennzoil.187 The inference is that the
value leakage would not have occurred if the public market could have
efficiently valued the legal dispute, i.e., accurately assessed the probability of
success. Although the payment of a judgment is always zero sum, the
valuational considerations are not necessarily so. In the public market at least,
uncertainty creates a cost that was not captured as a surplus by the opposing
side.188 This empirical evidence suggests that the concept of a cost of
resolution goes far beyond transaction cost.
The basic problem presented in Texaco–Pennzoil is also seen in the
simplest of tort cases. Imagine a two car accident. The parties are similarly
situated in credibility and resources, and one says the light was green and the
other says the light was red. Even a panel of neutral legal experts may
disagree as to the outcome of this simple case. The suggestion is not that ex
ante estimation of the decision standard is inappropriate. This task is part and
parcel of the business of dispute resolution. Rather, it is that the decision
standard is a variable point. It does not exist ex ante as a fixed reference point
that the parties must discover, but is simply an ex post result that the parties
184 David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress:
Evidence from the Texaco–Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 158, 160 (1988). The Texaco–Pennzoil
litigation was covered extensively in the Virginia Law Review’s Symposium on the Law and Economics of
Bargaining. See Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on “Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco”: Rational
Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REV. 335 (1989); David A. Lax, Commentary on “Understanding
Pennzoil v. Texaco”: Market Expectations of Bargaining Inefficiency and Potential Roles for External Parties
in Disputes Between Publicly Traded Companies, 75 VA. L. REV. 367 (1989); Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B.
Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295
(1989).
185 Cutler & Summers, supra note 184, at 169.
186 Id.
187 Id. (“The principal uncertainties revolved around likely legal judgments that both parties had
equivalent capacities to predict.”). Other financial economic studies support Cutler’s and Summers’s
observations of value leakage. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial
Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 228 (1994) (“These results are consistent
with the asymmetric effects documented in the Cutler and Summers (1988) study of Pennzoil v. Texaco.”);
Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1988) (examining, among other cases, Pennzoil v. Texaco).
188 See Bhagat et al., supra note 187, at 233 (“Our results indicate that lawsuits are not zero-sum games.”).
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achieve if they opt for trial. Because it is impossible for any party to know
whether he has accurately estimated its location ex ante (irrespective of the
rationality of that estimate), any theoretical framework that compares a party’s
beliefs to a fixed decision standard from a normative perspective is tautological
because it assumes knowledge that cannot be known.189
It can never be assumed that parties should try to accurately predict the
decision of the deliberative body because this assumes a level of predictive
power beyond the credible allowance of a rational person. The suggestion here
is not that case outcomes are so random that any endeavor to predict results is a
fool’s errand; rather, it is simply that the degree of precision implied by the
standard economic model is fool’s gold.190 Just like stock prices, perceived
case value fluctuates upon incorporation of new information.191 In the
markets, speculators can reasonably believe that a stock’s price will trade
within a broad range, but prices within this range may move stochastically
upon the disclosure of new information and events. Each person may hold a
rational belief about such matters based on information and application of
valuation conventions (and indeed a market cannot exist absent these
differences), but there cannot be an expectation that any individual belief is
accurate as to the expected return since “the mathematical expectation of the
speculator is zero.”192
The case assessment of a civil action follows a random walk like that of a
stock.193 The up–down movement of probability (expectation) is a function of
information dissemination. For illustrative purposes we can model the random
movements of legal assessment in a highly simplified form. An assessment
starts at any arbitrary point a and, after wandering through a discrete time

189 But see Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 4 (suggesting an empirical model to select disputes suitable for
litigation as opposed to settlement).
190 Disputes come in all flavors. Some are rather simple and typically settled early and routinely, while
others are more complex and tend to be disputed more. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE
SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 133–35 (1980) (noting that simple cases are
“routinized” in insurance claims process).
191 See Fama, supra note 183 (discussing various forms of the “efficient” market model).
192 BERNSTEIN, supra note 182, at 21 (quoting BACHELIER, supra note 182).
193 See FOCARDI & FABOZZI, supra note 97, at 219–32 (discussing random walk and Brownian motion
characteristics of stock movements). George Pólya is credited with coining the term “random walk.” See
GERALD L. ALEXANDERSON, THE RANDOM WALKS OF GEORGE PÓLYA 51 (2000) (discussing “his 1921 paper
on random walk, a phrase used for the first time by Pólya”). But the term shows up in other scientific and
mathematical inquiries published around the turn of the century. An early reference appeared as a problem
submitted by Professor Karl Pearson in 1905. Karl Pearson, The Problem of the Random Walk, 72 NATURE
294 (1905).
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period, ends at point z. Litigation is not static, so a party cannot rationally
expect this assessment to remain still from points a to z. An incremental
packet of information can move an assessment [+m, 0, −m] with equal
probability as to direction. Under these conditions, case assessment proceeds
as a trinomial walk in which each assessment is subject to a random equal
probability motion at each interval. Even a simple litigation under these
parameters can start to unravel into widely divergent random paths. Figure 1
shows an iteration of twenty different assessments moving in a trinomial
random walk.194
Figure 1

Case Assessment

Random Walk of Assessment

Progress of Litigation

The nature of litigation is stochastic,195 and thus a common quip among
lawyers is that “your case is never as good as when it first walked in your
office.” Although the dispersion pattern of individual assessments is random,
the average value at the end point z is virtually the same as the starting value at
point a, and the twenty data points take a distribution around a.196
194 The formula used to generate the graph is: P
(i + 1) = Pi + f(r) where ri = [m, 0, −m] and is generated by
a random equal probability function f(r).
195 A stochastic process is a continuous parameter process. See generally EMANUEL PARZEN, STOCHASTIC
PROCESSES (1962).
196 I started a at an arbitrary number of 50%, and assigned a value for m as 2%. Under this iteration, the
mean value of all twenty points at z was 50.2%, though the spread of outcomes is significant. Obviously,
individual litigants are only concerned about the outcome of their own cases. The potential variability of
outcomes creates the uncertainty that must be resolved through valuation.
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Collectively, there is an underlying order to the aggregate mass as would be
expected in a random mass phenomenon. Individually, however, the random
movements are precisely that—random and unpredictable. This stylized
exercise illustrates the paradox of probability in bargaining theory. The
expected value has not changed much; yet the possible outcomes are variable.
Uncertainty is the governing condition in a lawsuit. Variance measures risk,
but it is unaccounted for in the standard model. If a disputant is a repeat
player, like an insurance company or a casino, it can “play the odds” by
holding a portfolio that diversifies away much of this variance of outcome.197
If not, however, expectations based on aggregate data should have little
influence on decision making. Relevant are factors that influence the
assessment in this case, not some average from a class (even if we ignore the
thorny problem of defining a class). Aggregate analysis can show the forest in
its morning glory but not the light that dances inside the dew on any given tree.
One other point is noteworthy. Figure 1 shows that the potential variance
as measured by deviation from any current point to the final end point z
decreases as a case moves closer to z. In the legal context, we can expect that
the range of error in assessment narrows as the case approaches trial due to
better information. Thus, increased litigation reduces volatility of expected
outcome.198
IV. A PRICE THEORY OF LEGAL BARGAINING
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
In criticizing the standard model, this Article does not reject a cost-benefit
analysis. But the approach taken thus far in scholarly literature is practically
and theoretically problematic. Standard cost-benefit analysis tends to
emphasize completeness of evaluations, a requirement that is ill-suited to the

197 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 238–39 (noting that repeat players can take a risk-neutral approach toward
valuation that minimizes the risk-adjusted discount).
198 This is consistent with several financial economic principles. Under the Black-Scholes option pricing
theory, time lapse decays option value because a shorter time span means less variance of the underlying asset
price, which is a determinant of option value. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973) (“Normally, the value of an option declines as its
maturity date approaches, if the value of the stock does not change.”). In terms of stock price, the general
observation is that “the size of a market fluctuation tends to grow larger as the time horizon stretches out.” See
BERNSTEIN, supra note 182, at 21. A prediction of next day price change is less volatile than a prediction of a
one year forward price.
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valuational ambiguities of legal bargaining.199 Amartya Sen notes that
standard cost-benefit analysis “requires not only that each consequence be
identified and known . . . but also that the weights, at the appropriate point, are
definitive and unique.”200 This thought echoes the conditional limitations of
mathematical probability, i.e., “completeness of symmetry.”201
The assumptions of the existence of an objective decision standard and the
parties’ predictive powers to discover it create a complete information system
wherein the primary source of the unknown is information asymmetry among
parties.202 The solution to the problem is based on a mutual discovery of the
objective standard. The sentiment prefers a complete system wherein
valuations can be ordered rather than a system wherein optimization of choice
may not be feasible. But this sentiment conflicts with the empirical
observation of the practical world. Uncertainty begets the legal dispute, and so
we must consider the impact of litigation risks, transaction cost, probability,
weight, confidence, variance, and risk preferences. The complexity is great.
Valuational ambiguity and inability to order values need not preclude a
cost-benefit analysis, however. Sen argues the following:
When a particular exercise of cost-benefit analysis ends up with a
complete ordering and a clearly optimal outcome (or an optimal set
of outcomes), then that may be fine and good. But if that does not
happen, and the valuational ordering is incomplete, then
maximization with respect to that incomplete ranking is the natural
way to proceed. This may yield several maximal solutions that are
not comparable with each other, and it would make sense to choose
one of them. If the valuations come in the form of ranges of weights,
we can also do sensitivity analysis of the effect of reducing the
ranges of variations on extending the generated partial ordering. The
extent of imprecision can be reflected in the assessment, and the
choices can be systematically linked to the valuational
203
ambiguities.

This analytic approach echoes the logic of Keynesian probability theory.204
This philosophy of cost-benefit analysis avoids the pitfalls of “arbitrary
199

AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 565 (2002).
Id. at 563.
201 Supra note 121 and accompanying text; see supra Part III.A.
202 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 569 (“All that is necessary [for a failure of settlement] is that each
party have private information, that is, information not available to the other party.”).
203 SEN, supra note 199, at 565.
204 KEYNES, supra note 95.
200
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completion in terms of imperious valuational judgments or capricious
epistemic assessments.”205 A cost-benefit analysis is possible if we recognize
that, under conditions of uncertainty, its product may not be optimization of
choice (the best feasible choice given a defined set of options), but rather
maximization (a choice not worse than any other option).206 Under this
framework, the selection of litigation and trial can be analyzed with greater
complexity and avoids algebraic reductions that simply do not correspond to
reality.
B. Intrinsic Value, Noise, and Litigation Risk
What is the value of a disputed legal claim? To answer, it is helpful to take
a detour and see how the financial market works in a broad sense. In his
influential essay, Noise, Fischer Black observed that market participants trade
on either information or “noise.”207 Noise is “the arbitrary element in
expectations,” the diverse array of unrelated elements that causes price to
deviate from intrinsic value.208 Trading on information is profitable while
trading on noise is not.209 Noise trading is “the essential missing ingredient” in
a liquid, efficient market.210 If information is perfect and price always equals
intrinsic value, there would be no rationale to trade since there would be no
profit opportunity. “The price of a stock reflects both information that
information traders trade on and the noise that noise traders trade on.”211 The
noise in price creates profit opportunities and incentivizes information traders
to trade. Noise and information are at constant tug-of-war with noise pulling
price farther away from intrinsic value and information pushing it closer. The
problem from the standpoint of the speculator is that “[t]here will always be a
lot of ambiguity about who is an information trader and who is a noise
trader.”212 Thus, noise clouds value.

205

SEN, supra note 199, at 565.
Id. at 181–82. Optimization is the best choice in a defined set of options. Maximization is a choice
that can be made in ambiguity and incompleteness. Id.
207 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). Fischer Black, along with Myron Scholes, developed the
Black-Scholes option pricing model. See infra note 250. Scholes won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1997.
Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Oct. 14, 1997), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economics/laureates/1997/press.html. Black died in 1995, making him ineligible to receive the award. Id.
208 Black, supra note 207, at 529, 530.
209 Id. at 531.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 532.
206
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A profound paradox of an efficient market is that it causes prices to be less
perfect, and this inefficiency is the substance of its existence.213 The price of a
stock tends to move back to intrinsic value over time, but its relative position is
not fixed or knowable: “All estimates of value are noisy, so we can never know
how far away price is from value.”214 Expected value—the touchstone of
standard cost-benefit analysis—is an elusive concept, and perhaps inconsistent
with the informational limitations of the practical world.215 Given these
conditions, Black speculated that “an efficient market [is] one in which price is
within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less
than twice value.”216 This factor of two is “arbitrary” but intuitively
“reasonable” in light of the impossibility of empirical testing.217 The nature of
an efficient market is such that price swings back and forth within a broad
range and it is never known whether price is aligned with value or who has a
superior conception of valuation. There is never a long-term equilibrium state
of efficient convergence of price to value.
Applying these concepts to the legal market, we see that if information was
perfect and noiseless (a Coasian condition), there would be no litigation or
settlement as there would be no dispute. But knowledge is based on
incomplete information and imperfect future projections, and it supports
divergent beliefs bounded by plausible reasoning.218 Describing litigation as
indeterminate is not enough, however. It would be disappointing if at the end
of the theoretical inquiry there is only randomness. Fortunately, this is not the
case. Although reliable predictability may be an impossible goal qua the
individual case, we can still understand the complex system by which disputes
are resolved.
To understand dispute risk, we must first unpack the components of
litigation uncertainty. There are uncertainties associated with facts and laws,
judges and juries, attorneys and clients, and strategy and serendipity. Beyond
213

Id..
Id. at 533.
215 Black asked, “Why do people trade on noise?” Id. at 534. Utility from gambling is one answer.
Another answer is that a noise trader thinks she is an information trader. If so, Black questioned the value of
the classical concept of expected utility maximization: “Once we let trading enter the utility function directly
(as a way of saying that people like to trade), it’s hard to know where to stop. If anything can be in the utility
function, the notion that people act to maximize expected utility is in danger of losing much of its content.” Id.
216 Id. at 533.
217 Id.
218 Such omniscience as to even past and present information is difficult, if not impossible. See H.
Richard Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (1975) (truth takes “plural forms” and is “multifaceted”).
214
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these are the financial risks. A plaintiff asserts a legal claim, which may be
“bought” by a defendant either voluntarily or by forced purchase; similarly, a
defendant asserts a defense, which may be “bought” by a plaintiff. One seeks
the highest price, and the other seeks the lowest. If a lawsuit is considered a
market transaction, then portfolio theory sheds some light on the nature of
litigation risk.
In Portfolio Selection, Markowitz mathematically proved that for each level
of risk there was an efficient portfolio of diversified assets that maximized
returns.219 In so doing, he classified two kinds of risk in a portfolio. Market
risk is the systemic risk that diversification cannot reduce, such as the risks of
market downturn, interest rate movements, political events, and regulation.220
Unique risk is the risk associated with an investment in a particular stock, such
as management quality, financial resources, and, in the era of Enron, ethical
risk.221 Markowitz theorized that a well-diversified portfolio can mitigate
unique risk and approximate market risk.222 In an uncertain world, risk and
reward are conjoined twins. His key insight was not that risk was bad per se,
but that unnecessary risk was not good.223 Thus, portfolios can be
mathematically structured so that for each level of risk appetite there is a
maximized expected return.224
In an earlier article, I applied Markowitz’s insight to the legal process, and
isolated two primary components of uncertainty involved in a lawsuit:

219 Markowitz, supra note 172, at 77. Before the publication of this article, the market did not understand
the nature of financial risk in stock selection. “Throughout most of the history of stock markets . . . it never
occurred to anyone to define risk with a number. Stocks were risky and some were riskier than others, and
people let it go at that. Risk was in the gut, not in the numbers.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 247. This
problem was identified in Graham and Dodd’s classic treatise on security valuation, which set forth the
following theory of stock valuation: “The value of a common stock depends entirely upon what it will earn in
the future.” BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: THE CLASSIC 1940 SECOND EDITION
351 (1962). Yet, when Graham and Dodd stated this “complete revolution in the philosophy of common-stock
investment,” they were unable to quantify the risk for “lack of well-defined and authoritative views” on
valuation. Id. at 352, 362. Thus, in 1940, they counseled that valuation was largely a qualitative, judgmental
exercise and stocks should be valued on qualitative assessments that are “reasonable.” Id. at 362, 363–71.
220 See Markowitz, supra note 172, at 79 (“Diversification cannot eliminate all variance.”). Market risk is
sometimes called systemic or undiversifiable risk. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 162 n.27.
221 Unique risk is sometimes called unsystemic risk, residual risk, specific risk, or diversifiable risk.
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 162 n.26.
222 Markowitz, supra note 172, at 79.
223 Markowitz observed that most investors “consider yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad thing;
gambling, to be avoided.” Id. at 91.
224 Id. at 79 (“There is a rate at which the investor can gain expected return by taking on variance, or
reduce variance by giving up expected return.”).
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General risk encompasses the systemic process risk associated
with the legal forum, which can be seen as a market. This market
risk constitutes the uncertainty associated with the decisions of the
jury and the judge, who are influenced by their life experiences,
opinions, predispositions, and the prevailing community standards.
General risk is unrelated to the case, and is systemic to all lawsuits
brought before deliberative bodies. It not only includes the risk of
unpredictable human interactions, but also unpredictable
discretionary decisions where there are two or more decision paths,
neither of which could be classified as wrong or irrational in the
sense of reversible error. Under this view, reversible error can be
understood to occur when a deliberative body arbitrarily increases the
general risk of a litigant beyond the range of rational multivariate
decision-making. A lawsuit with only general risk is akin to a game
of pure chance. The matter is left purely to the deliberative bodies
without input or influence, and it is no surprise that many practicing
trial lawyers consider the unpredictability and randomness of a trial
as akin to a pure gamble.
Unique risk is the risk associated with the specific case. This risk
is comprised of two general categories: the totality of the factual and
evidentiary circumstances and the substantive and procedural laws
specifically applicable to the case. Unique risk encompasses such
factors as the strength of the facts, the likeability and sympathy
elements of the client, the quantity and quality of witnesses, and
other circumstances of the case such as the skill of the lawyers and
financial resources of the parties. The substantive law is also a key
determinant. The law can skew the risk for one party or another, and
often the risk is allocated based on various policy and efficiency
grounds. All of these factors combine to create the unique risk
profile for any given case. Unique risk converts a lawsuit from a
game of chance to a game of skill in which some of the randomness
225
or unpredictability can be influenced.
225 Rhee, supra note 30, at 157–58 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). This theory is consistent with
general market practices as seen in the insurance industry.

In evaluating the serious case, a large number of variables are taken into account. Among these
are the obvious out-of-pocket costs, along with an allowance for the pain, suffering, and
inconvenience of the claimant. In addition, evaluation of the serious injury claim includes
attention to aspects of the case that, while formally irrelevant to value, would be expected to
exert influence if litigation were in fact undertaken. Among these are the sympathetic or
antipathetic characteristics of the parties who might appear: the claimant, the insured, and
witnesses. Age, race, sex, and occupation are said to be relevant, as well as more subjective
attributes such as over-all impression of veracity. The reputed skill of the attorneys and the
nature of the court in which the case might be brought are also considered.
ROSS, supra note 190, at 113.
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Litigation risk is not a unity. Because general risk Rg is systemic, it is not
subject to mitigation short of illegal action (e.g., a bribe or other undue
influence).226 Only settlement terminates exposure to general risk. The
elimination of variance is a key advantage of settlement over trial, all else
being equal (a significant condition).227
Fact finding and liability
determination, in the absence of omniscience, are subject to a degree of
constant risk.228 As for unique risk Ru, some aspects are within the sphere of
influence. Facts and case theories are influenced by the intellectual capital
invested in the case. Labor increases the chance of success in the constant
competition of ideas.229 Nevertheless, there is a limit to the power of creativity
and industry. Sometimes, facts are facts and laws are laws. In these
circumstances, the challenge is to understand the contours of the risks, and an
attorney as an advocate is fundamentally a risk manager.230
A legal dispute is traded in the sense that claims are priced, bought, and
sold per settlement or judgment. It is not a typical commodity, however.231
From the perspective of valuation, the problems are three. First, each dispute
has a unique set of buyers and sellers, and no other market participants can

226

Some of the common practices of trial lawyers are best seen as a way to understand or mitigate the
general risk associated with each case. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 517 (noting the increasing use of jury
consultants and public relations consultants).
227 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 229 (noting that the elimination of variance is the primary inducement to
settlement).
228 The recognition of variance is seen in Lavender v. Kurn:
Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it
is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference.
327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
229 See Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995) (discussing the
relationship between effort and trial results); Posner, supra note 1, at 419 (“A change in the stakes will affect
the amount of money that the parties spend on litigation and this in turn will alter the probabilities of a
particular outcome.”); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or
on wits borrowed from the adversary.”).
230 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239, 243 (1984) (attorneys are “transaction cost engineers” who promote efficient prices); Rhee, supra
note 12, at 253–56 (discussing the role of attorneys in enhancing the asset value of a lawsuit).
231 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1376 (1971) (Lawsuit is “a complex pattern of gestures comprising what Henry Hart and John
McNaughton once called ‘society’s last line of defense in the indispensable effort to secure the peaceful
settlement of social conflict.’” (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & John T. McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in
the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 52 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1959)).
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enter the transaction, creating a problem of liquidity and price transparency.232
Second, a related problem, the asset for sale is not fungible, and so a market
for the sale and purchase of legal claims (disputed rights), even if permitted
under law, is not possible. Third, unless a private agreement is reached, a
forced transaction can be imposed, and this carries significant risk.233 These
traits dictate the pricing mechanisms.
The uniqueness of each case disaggregates the legal market into single
transactions of noncompetitive pricing. Superficial similarities with other
cases may yield some insight, but ultimately each case stands on its unique
portfolio of risk. Even for a repeat player, trading on aggregate or composite
data runs the risk of trading on noise. Since price efficiency cannot be
achieved in the traditional sense, the goal of dispute resolution should be
transactional efficiency, defined not in terms of transaction cost economics,
but in terms of pricing that is achieved at the lowest cost of resolution. In
many cases, the transaction cost associated with litigation is only a secondary
contributor to the total cost of a dispute. Cutler and Summers observed that
“legal disputes can impose large costs on a firm, and that the indirect effects of
conflict on profitability can be substantially greater than the direct expense of
the litigation.”234 A similar study of public market reaction to lawsuits has
concluded that transaction costs are “relatively small” compared to the indirect
cost of financial distress (i.e., the cost associated with uncertainty arising from
the litigation).235 While this Article does not suggest that most lawsuits are
comparable in scale to Texaco–Pennzoil or other large litigation involving
public companies, the larger point is that potential transaction cost savings can
pale in comparison to a misstep in valuation even in ordinary cases. Thus, the
true economic cost of a dispute is not synonymous with transaction cost.
The cost of resolution is akin to a corporation’s cost of equity, the
measurement of a firm’s enterprise risk, in the sense that the cost is imbedded
in the valuation. The value of a case must incorporate an appropriate risk
adjustment. Although the standard model correctly perceives the “litigation

232 Prices in the commercial context are made more transparent by a liquid market. See FOCARDI &
FABOZZI, supra note 97, at 31 (“Pricing efficiency refers to a market where prices at all times fully reflect all
available information that is relevant to the valuation of securities.”); see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970).
233 Cornell, supra note 12, at 175 (“When a lawsuit is filed, the defendant is forced to write litigation
options at prices that depend on the plaintiff’s cost of pursuing the suit.”).
234 Cutler & Summers, supra note 184, at 170.
235 Bhagat et al., supra note 187, at 222–23.
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investment” through the lens of cash flow analysis,236 it errs by equating
transaction cost surplus with transactional efficiency. No pricing theory of
dispute resolution is complete without the incorporation of the cost of
uncertainty into valuation. Rational settlement should be struck only under
one condition—when prices converge after consideration of the appropriate
risk premium or discount. This statement requires some unpacking.
At the start of any case, the uncertainty is great. If risk is relevant to the
question of valuation, then it must figure prominently into the calculus.
Consistent with the principles of portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (“CAPM”), this uncertainty discounts the value of the lawsuit to a value
that is less or more than the purely probabilistic expected value.237 At this
early stage, settlement may be difficult because continued litigation presents an
opportunity for information acquisition, which is categorically a good thing.238
The question for each party is: do we speculate by settling now, and if so, what
is the price at which we are incentivized to take the gamble? Settlement
terminates the option value of continued litigation, i.e., opportunity for
information acquisition. The plaintiff adds a premium to his settlement
demand, and the defendant discounts the counteroffer accordingly. A blind
adherence to expected value would suggest that uncertainty does not affect
value because it presumably cuts both ways. This is akin to a gamble on a coin
toss; the risk is irrelevant because it cuts both ways. We can agree that the fate
of an ambiguous right should not be left to the proxy of an arbitrary outcome.
The plaintiff and defendant apply a premium and discount, respectively, which
create a valuation gap. Conventional wisdom explains this phenomenon in
terms of strategic behavior: A party seeks to grab a bigger share of the surplus,
“anchor” the claim, or posture for positional bargaining.239 While these
strategic considerations may be true, they are an incomplete explanation. Odd
is the thought that highly trained participants of the legal market would
misprice settlement on the chance that the other party is naïve or foolish when
236 See Cornell, supra note 12, at 173; Johnson, supra note 25, at 573 (describing the “litigation
investment”); Trubek et al., supra note 2, at 76 (characterizing litigation as “an investment process”).
237 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 238–39.
238 “It is common to say that conflicts can be resolved more easily under full information, when all parties
concerned understand the consequences of the alternative possible policies or other decisions.” Kenneth J.
Arrow, Information Acquisition and the Resolution of Conflict, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 258,
259 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
239 This “inefficiency” could be rooted in a conflict of interest between attorneys and agency costs. See
Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69–72 (1997) (discussing
problem of conflict of interest relating to fees). However, I question whether a systemic problem is sustainable
in a large, competitive market for legal services.

RHEE GALLEYSFINAL

2006]

3/15/2007 11:52:42 AM

A PRICE THEORY OF LEGAL BARGAINING

675

the risk of continued expenditure of transaction cost is significant.240 It
suggests a degree of irrationality among peers of relatively equal competence
and training,241 and would portray them as performing a ritualistic mating
dance having little chance of consummation. At some point, market
participants would have realized that there is little arbitrage opportunity from
reflexive valuational posturing, and such reflexive behavior would have
naturally diminished to a marginalized level. But this is not the empirical
observation. The problem of valuation is a constant in dispute resolution, and
the incorporation of a premium and discount may simply reflect the valuational
uncertainty at hand. The explanation for the seemingly strategic, perhaps
inefficient, behavior is that a fundamental economic mechanism is at work
rather than mass irrationality by a trained group of professionals.
From the perspective of market pricing, a wide bid-ask spread is indicative
of significant uncertainty associated with the underlying asset. It is often said
that a defendant is a buyer of the plaintiff’s claim. In this context, he is the
market maker in the dispute, available to “buy” the claim at prices he sets. But
this analogy is incomplete because the plaintiff, too, is a market maker since
she can buy the defendant’s option to contest the dispute.242 Accordingly, in
the beginning each party will “bid” the least favorable terms to the other and
“ask” the most favorable subject only to the consideration of a forced sale,
which increases in likelihood as the case progresses.243 This valuation gap is
240

Journalistic accounts noted that Texaco and Pennzoil failed to strike a bargain because of mutual
animosity. Cutler and Summers dismissed the notion that emotional noise or irrational motives played a role:
“Two billion dollars, however, seem like a lot to pay to engage in pique.” Cutler & Summers, supra note 184,
at 169.
241 I do not suggest that the talent level in the legal profession is consistent. Marc Galanter notes that
corporations can afford to pay highly specialized attorneys, who presumably are well-skilled in their trade.
See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 53 BUFFALO L. REV.
1369, 1407–10 (2006); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 114–19 (1974). The point is well-taken. My suggestion is
that as a general observation, attorneys receive comparable education and training. From this beginning,
rewards of their profession, I believe, is in direct relation to the sweat of their labor.
242 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 226–27 (discussing the mutual market-maker role of parties in a lawsuit).
243 This is consistent with Guthrie’s regret aversion theory, which posits that parties make bargaining
decisions so as to minimize the emotion of post-transaction regret. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than
Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45 (1999). Settlement is
by no means less risky. Under this view, we see how trust between parties or the simplicity of a case reduces
uncertainty and thus the risk adjustment required to settle. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 166, at 564
(“When opposing lawyers know and trust each other, we believe there often will be substantial opportunities
for both parties to benefit by reducing transaction costs.”); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in
Negotiating Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 282 n.256 (1991)
(trust is a significant factor in bargaining though not emphasized in economic literature because it lacks the
quality of quantification).
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not static, but instead changes with, among other things, the expenditure of
transaction costs.
Transaction cost controls the flow of information and thus reduces
uncertainty.244 As a matter gets closer to trial, information asymmetry
diminishes due to disclosure requirements and incentives to disclose
voluntarily.245 In this process, each new piece of information has less impact
on weight, and so weight increases, but at a diminishing marginal rate as each
incremental fact has less overall impact.246 Figure 2 illustrates the marginal
utility of information acquisition and the marginal utility of transaction cost.

244 The most important economic concepts of the past thirty years have been information dispersion and
uncertainty. Three Nobel Laureates on the State of Economics, CHALLENGE, Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 6, 19
(interview with Kenneth Arrow).
245 A lawsuit changes the nature of the game. Information must now be disclosed under the rules of
procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 30–37, 41(b), 45. Positive information serves no purpose if it is ultimately
kept in secret. Negative information will be kept private so long as it is ethical to do so. Verification is more
costly but also more reliable because disclosure is subject to judicial sanctions, professional discipline, and
reputational harm.
246 This relationship can be mathematically represented. Let I ∈ I where I is the set of all relevant,
i
knowable information pertaining to the dispute. We assume for simplicity that each packet of information Ii

n

has equal weight (impact). Weight is a function of information acquisition: W =

Ii
i =1 I

. The change in

weight is measured by f(w) = Wi+1/Wi − 1. The marginal utility of transaction cost is measured by the rate of
change in the weight per time. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 1072 (“The derivative [function] can
be thought of as the marginal productivity of plaintiff’s effort at trial.”).
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Figure 2

Marginal Utility of
Transaction Cost

Risk Adjustment

Valuation Delta

Progress of Litigation

At the beginning of a case, the risk associated with the lack of information
is great. Each party applies a risk adjustment to valuation—a premium for the
plaintiff and a discount for the defendant. Valuations are initially repelled by
the mutual incorporation of a risk adjustment, creating a valuation delta. As
uncertainty is reduced, delta converges consistent with diminishing marginal
utility of transaction costs.247 The result is an increased propensity to settle, all
else being equal (on this point, note that weight and probability are
independent such that it is impossible to predict the “random walk” of the case
assessment based upon the knowledge that unknown information will be
disclosed in the future). Contrary to the standard model, probability does not
necessarily converge, so much as the risk adjustments are mutually reduced as
litigation progresses and weight increases. Thus, in many meritorious actions,
litigation is not a waste, but rather an essential ingredient of the dispute
resolution process.
The risk adjustment is best understood as the opportunity cost of using a
different pricing mechanism. Each party has a unilateral procedural option to

247 See Arrow, supra note 238, at 259 (Better information in the decision-making process is superior
“provided of course that the gain in outcome is sufficient to compensate for the cost of acquiring the
information.”).
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elect trial.248 Since settlement terminates this option, each side must be
compensated for its forbearance.249 This legal option has tangible value.250
The option value is the greatest in the beginning. The benefit of information
acquisition is the greatest at the start of a case, independent of the expectation
that the unknown information will benefit a particular party. Although it is
irrational to believe that unknown information yet to be disclosed will be
beneficial, it is rational to seek disclosure of this information because
uncertainty is reduced. As the case approaches trial, the option value
diminishes until expiration at judgment. The greater the uncertainty
surrounding the case, the greater is the benefit of continuing the litigation.
This explains why settlements still occur in advanced stages of litigation when
a great portion of the transaction cost has become sunk cost—the diminished
relevance of transaction cost is offset by the diminution of option value.251
C. Variance, Probability, and Risk Preference
If probability defines the subjective expectation of an outcome, variance
defines the confidence associated with that belief. Variance depends on a
number of factors. As seen, the point in time in litigation is a crude
approximation of weight and is important because the potential divergence of a
“random walk” from the original point is greater with time. Imperfect
information arises not only from information asymmetry (a problem of
dissemination), but also from the unknowable nature of some knowledge (a
problem of epistemology). If the parties believe that there is a substantial
amount of unknowable information, the perception of variance would naturally
rise. We consider also the unique risk of a case—its simplicity or complexity
and the state of information pertaining to the laws and facts applicable to the
case. Lastly, variance depends on general risk: the degree to which the
jurisdiction or deliberative body is perceived to be predictable. One suspects
248 Posner calls this option a “bilateral monopoly.” POSNER, supra note 22, at 567. But an option analogy
works better because it connotes a financial instrument that can be valued, if only conceptually.
249 The parties may “net out” the mutual options by engaging in a swap transaction. See Rhee, supra note
12, at 244. If, however, the option values are different, there still remains a residual option value held by one
party.
250 The value of a financial option is calculated by the Black-Scholes option pricing model, which is a
differential equation that considers the permutations of six variables affecting option value (stock price, strike
price, risk-free rate, dividend yield, time to maturity, and variance). Black & Scholes, supra note 198; see also
JOHN C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 1204–12 (1985) (presenting the Black-Scholes
formula and the underlying mathematical concepts); HULL, supra note 170, at 157 (same).
251 See Rhee, supra note 12, at 240–45 (discussing the real option of litigation and its relationship to
lawsuit valuation).
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that this factor is not dramatically different across various jurisdictions, though
this assertion would be difficult to prove one way or the other.
Variance is the error term that captures the totality of the information risks,
and it can be expressed as σ = f(W, Ru) + Rg. The limit of perfect disclosure is
general risk where σ = Rg. Variance, a measure of risk, is a proxy for the
confidence in one’s assessment of probability, or stated differently the degree
to which the forecast could be wrong. Risk, then, is one of the most important
factors in valuation and investment.252
Under the standard model, risk neutrality eliminates via assumption the
most difficult element in the analysis of legal valuation. Figure 3 below
illustrates the selection hypothesis of the standard model. It shows that the
selection of trial and settlement depends on the ratio of the probability
difference multiplied by the expected judgment amount over the aggregate
transaction cost surplus. If this ratio is greater than 1.0, then trial must be the
result. The selection horizon, marked by the dotted line, is the point at which a
party is indifferent between trial and settlement. Under the standard model,
variance plays no role in valuation or the selection process, and thus the slope
of the selection horizon is vertical. Moreover, the x-intercept is the ratio 1.0, a
point at which the difference in risk neutral valuation equals the transaction
cost surplus.

252 In the corporate finance context, variance and valuation are intimately linked. As with option
valuation, variance is the key variable in determining a firm’s cost of equity. Unlike options, however,
variance of earnings reduces the value of a firm. See id. at 202–08 (discussing the application of option
pricing and capital asset pricing models on legal valuation).
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Figure 3
Selection of Settlement and Litigation
(Standard Model)

Variance

Selection Horizon

Settlement

Trial

1.0

(P∆ x L)/B

This Article posits that risk is the governing condition in a lawsuit, and thus
risk neutrality cannot be the basis of a theory of legal valuation. If a lawsuit is
considered a capital asset that is expected to generate a future, uncertain cash
flow (a negative cash flow for a defendant), variance must reduce the value of
the asset and conversely increase the negative value of the liability.253 The
selection of settlement and trial depends on a number of factors. Transaction
costs play a key role, of course. This Article does not dispute the rule of
thumb that says the greater the relative value of transaction cost, the greater is
the possibility of a settlement. Transaction cost plays a greater role in smaller,
more routine cases where it simply does not make sense to spend significant
costs.254 In cases where the damages are substantial or the case is otherwise
more complex, however, transactional efficiency involves more than
transaction cost efficiency.
As discussed above, the value of the litigation option diminishes as a case
proceeds closer to trial. During this time, the variance of a case assessment
also diminishes with information acquisition. The net result is that the option
value of continued litigation tends to diminish while the risk adjustment to
253

See id.
Most simple cases are processed routinely and a certain degree of “routinization” takes hold. See
ROSS, supra note 190, at 133–35. However, the forecasting of judicial outcomes is “certainly more complex
and more sensitive to the particular aspects of a given claim than procedure used in routine cases.” Id. at 115.
254
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settlement also tends to decrease with less uncertainty. During this time, a
party continuously assesses her confidence in the expected result at trial. High
variance (low confidence) tends to produce settlement because it eliminates
exposure to high risk. Similar to the treatment of highly volatile earnings in
the markets, high variance discounts valuation. Accordingly, if both parties
perceive high variance of trial outcome, the risk adjustment to expected value
discounts valuations further and thus settlement valuations tend to converge.
Variance is simply one part of the equation, however. Greater difference in
probabilistic assessments obviously undermines settlement, and so a high
probability delta pulls valuations apart. Assuming that variance is not high
enough to discount trial valuation below settlement valuation, parties would
likely opt for trial where their views are divergent and where both are highly
confident of their respective beliefs. These observations are intuitive.

Figure 4

Variance

Selection of Settlement and Litigation

Settlement

Trial

Rg
Probability

Figure 4 illustrates the interaction of variance and probability, which is a
variation of the traditional risk–return horizon seen in finance theory. The
location and slope of the selection horizon determines one’s preference for
settlement and trial. Unless risk neutrality and rational expectation are
assumed,255 the location and slope of the selection horizon is unique to each
party. Its location, as determined by the x-intercept, indicates the degree of
255

See supra Part II.C.
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risk preference: if the selection horizon moves laterally to the right (see above
arrow), trial is less preferred than settlement, indicating a stronger degree of
risk aversion, and vice versa. If parties are risk neutral, the selection horizon
would be located near the equilibrium point where (Pp − Pd) x J
B. The
slope would be vertical as well since variance would not affect the choice
between settlement and trial (see above dotted line). Because we do not expect
most people, practically or theoretically, to ignore uncertainty of return,
uncertainty must affect the location of the selection criteria in most cases.256
The selection horizon is typically shifted to the right of the risk neutral
valuation. This is marked by the solid sloped line. A shift of the selection
horizon to the right means that the risk preferences of most people would
dictate that the uncertainty of trial is disfavored. This phenomenon is
consistent with the empirical observation that most cases tend to settle.

≈

In addition to the location of the selection horizon, we must also consider
its slope.257 The slope is the measure of the cost of variance, defined as the
degree to which a quantum of risk results in a discount given the opportunity
cost of the value (asset or liability) at stake. The greater this cost, the greater a
quantum of risk will result in a discount to value at stake. Accordingly, it is
the discount rate applicable in the valuation of a disputed right, and each party
has a unique cost of variance depending on one’s circumstance.
Moreover, each case does not impact the parties similarly. It is entirely
possible, and in some circumstances probable, that the parties calculate
different risks even when they perceive the facts and laws similarly. Consider,
for example, a repeat player who would be less sensitive to the outcome of a
particular case than a single-play party because a diversified portfolio reduces
the variance from unique risk. The risk assumed is only the undiversifiable
general risk. These parties have lower cost of capital because diversification
reduces the variance of outcomes. In other words, corporations and their
shareholders can diversify their business mixes and holdings in a way that
reduces or eliminates the variance of any single case. This is not the case with
single-play parties, such as most individuals, who must assume both the
general and unique risks of each dispute. Moreover, we also expect that one’s
wealth relative to the disputed stake has a role in the perception of risk. The
256 Indeed, even insurance companies, pure players in the risk trade, apply a “danger value,” which is a
premium in excess of the expected value to eliminate exposure to a potentially severe jury verdict, when a case
presents a potential for a low frequency, high severity payout. ROSS, supra note 190, at 202.
257
A positive slope value means that for every change in the x value there is a corresponding change in
the y value, noted as dy/dx, such that dy/dx > 0.
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typical case may represent a small portion of the wealth of a large institutional
party, and thus the impact of any case on one’s wealth may be small. But as
we saw in the Texaco–Pennzoil litigation, large, undiversifiable lawsuits can
increase even a large firm’s cost of capital. These effects are also seen in
individuals. Some single-play parties, such as wealthy people, may be
insensitive to risk due to a diminishing marginal utility of money. On the other
hand, a single-play party whose legal dispute constitutes a substantial portion
of his wealth may be highly sensitive to the variance of outcome since the risk
cannot be diversified away or hedged in some form. As discussed, the only
“hedge” against this risk constitutes valuational concessions during the
bargaining process. The cost of capital here would be more, and this would be
reflected in a discount in the value of the asset. The important point here is
that the perception of risk can not only be understood from a case-specific
viewpoint, but also from a broader viewpoint of one’s portfolio for a repeat
player and wealth (or capital holding).
The intuition is, then, that the selection horizon slopes positively: as
variance rises to complete uncertainty of outcome, parties would settle rather
than submit to a seemingly random, arbitrary system of justice. Lower
variance tends to facilitate trial, resulting in a positive slope. This is contrary
to Priest and Klein’s conclusion that greater uncertainty of outcome tends to
produce trials.258 My intuition follows from asking this simple question: what
is the most extreme condition under which trial is virtually guaranteed to
occur? It is when the probability delta is the greatest and there is near-perfect
information (and so variance is low and confidence is high). This Article uses
the term “near-perfect” because general risk can never be eliminated. The
decision standard is neither fixed nor known; instead there is perfect
dissemination of knowable information, and thus confidence in assessment is
the highest. Moreover, since probability is not an objective reference, a highprobability delta can coexist with near-perfect information. We can easily see
how people would be willing to bet bigger with an increased confidence in the
expected payoff. Believing this to be the case, parties would proceed to trial
instead of settling. Conversely, when delta is zero and there is near-perfect
information, settlement and trial are synonymous resolutions because all
disputes would be resolved. Coasian transaction cost economics governs as a
dominant solution, and so we would expect a settlement consistent with the
standard model. Again, this is implied by a positively sloping selection
horizon. Moreover, recall that variance depends on weight, unique risk, and
258

See supra Part II.B.
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general risk. General risk is systemic and constitutes a constant baseline risk
that all parties incur in any litigation. In the above Figure 4, Rg is marked by
the horizontal dashed line. Assume that Rg in a hypothetical jurisdiction was
extraordinarily high for whatever reason; it would rise, and if it rises high
enough, no party would ever take a meritorious case to trial because the
endeavor may be akin to playing a game of pure chance, a speculative
endeavor that rational parties would avoid.259
In the face of such
circumstances, parties would always settle rather than submit to a process that
is perceived to be entirely random. Again, this condition is met only if the
selection horizon slopes positively, implying that trials are most likely when
delta is high and variance is low.
The last factor in the selection hypothesis of settlement and trial is
individual risk preference. This preference determines the location of each
party’s selection horizon. Risk aversion shifts the selection horizon to the right
(see arrow in Figure 4), expanding the settlement and contracting the trial
zone. Risk-averse people tend to prefer settlement to trial, and vice versa.
Individual risk preference implies a cost of risk preference, defined as the
discount or premium given for the preference for a certain result measured as
the difference between the risk-neutral value of a variable outcome and the
value at which the individual is indifferent between the sum certain and that
risk-neutral value.
Unlike the more abstract cost of resolution, we can infer a concrete cost
from insurance profitability data. An insurer, a pure player in the risk trade,
prices its premium so that premium covers the expected actuarial loss plus cost
of operations plus profit. The insurance market is competitive, and so
premiums represent efficient prices.260 The industry measures profitability by
a combined ratio defined as [(Incurred Losses) + (Operating Expenses)] ÷
(Earned Premiums). This basic insurance formula has not changed since the
days of Adam Smith and the inception of Lloyd’s of London.261 Most
policyholders understand, if only implicitly, that their premiums are in excess
of their expected actuarial loss because insurers expect to pay expenses and
259 Of course, frivolous cases would be brought in great numbers if the justice system was perceived as
arbitrary.
260 See Letter from Chairman Warren E. Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 6 (Feb. 28,
2005) (“price competition in insurance is usually fierce”), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
2004ltr.pdf.
261 SMITH, supra note 50, at 125 (“[C]ommon premium must be sufficient to compensate the common
losses, to pay the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn from an equal
capital employed in any common trade.”).
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earn a profit. The payment in excess of actuarial risk, including the
opportunity cost of capital on unearned premium, is a reasonable
approximation of the average cost of risk aversion for catastrophic risk.
Because a risk-neutral person would avoid purchasing insurance unless
mandated by law, a risk-averse policyholder buys the elimination of risk at the
cost of risk aversion.262 Based on this reasoning, the implied cost of
catastrophic risk aversion is approximately 30% of the actuarial risk.263 In
other words, a highly risk-averse person would accept approximately $70
rather than take a chance at an expected value of $100.
Although most people are risk averse, the cost of risk aversion is probably
less than insurance data would suggest. First, since insurance typically
protects against catastrophic loss, risk aversion is linked to the marginal utility
of wealth.264 Unless the lawsuit involves a dispute over a catastrophic or high
value loss, risk aversion is expected to be less.265 Second, we must remember
that attorneys are repeat players. To the extent that they have influence over
the settlement, which is to say they have a significant role, their judgment may
temper the risk-averse tendencies of their clients. In sum, we expect riskaverse parties in the aggregate to discount their valuations, but at levels less
than 30%.
262 See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1992) (rationale of
insurance is the desire to avoid risk at a cost).
263 The average incurred loss and operating expense have been 79.2% and 25.6% of premiums,
respectively, and so the average combined ratio has been 104.8%. See BEST’S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES—
PROPERTY/CASUALTY 90 (2005) (average data collected for 5 years from 2000 to 2004 and from 2356
property and casualty insurance companies). Note that 100% represents the entirety of the collected premium,
and the industry incurred a 4.8% loss on operations from underwriting. These figures suggest that 20.8% of
premiums went to operating expenses of the industry. The average return on invested assets for the industry
has been 5.2%. Id. at 88. This figure includes yields on earned premiums, surplus, and unearned premiums
belonging to the policyholders who forego their opportunity cost of capital by paying premiums upfront. To
approximate the earnings on unearned premiums, we could estimate the weighted average of unearned
premiums as half of the premiums submitted at the beginning of the year. This implies a 2.6% contribution to
the policyholder’s cost of insurance. The cost of risk is stated as a percentage of the actuarial risk, which is the
expected value of the loss. If investment yield is added to the cost, the cost of risk aversion is: (20.8% + 2.6%)
÷ 79.2% = 30% (rounded).
264 Anecdotally, I tested this calculation on my family over dinner one night. I asked, “How much would
you take in a fixed value instead of a lottery ticket with a 50–50 chance of winning $20,000?” The answers
were in the range of $6000 to $9000, suggesting they were risk averse (as most people are). I also presented
the same hypothetical to my first-year Torts class of about eighty students, and the cost of risk aversion
appeared to range from approximately $1000 to $4000. Of course, this is hardly scientific, but it suggests that
the range is probably reasonable and varies according to individual risk preferences and marginal utility of
wealth.
265 This is not to suggest that many cases do not present claims for catastrophic loss. Certainly many tort
claims involve significant injury for which money damages may provide an incomplete remedy.
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The practical implication of risk aversion is that repeat players tend to be
risk neutral, allowing a portfolio approach toward risk management, a luxury
that most people lack. The end result is that variance from unique risk can be
reduced. Of course, the better repeat player focuses on the unique details of
each case with an eye toward the aggregate whole, thus trading on information
rather than noise. Risk-neutral parties, like insurance companies, will obtain a
greater share of any settlement because they can extract yield from the
differences in both risk preferences and risk discount. Likewise, if most
corporations are repeat players, this fact has significant implications for
whether corporate defendants in tort actions are appropriately deterred by tort
law and its remedies. Thus, while this Article assumes a single play scenario,
the most practical effect of a repeat play scenario is the shifting of the selection
horizon to the left (against settlement) for a repeat player, which creates a
valuational separation against a single play party.
D. Selection of Settlement and Trial
How do parties value a disputed legal claim? In The Nature of the Firm,
Coase explained that there is “a cost of using the price mechanism.”266 The
key assumption of the Coase Theorem is that economic assets are allocated
efficiently under “conditions of perfect competition,” where “the price system
is assumed to work smoothly (that is, costless).”267 A rational choice between
two economic options can only be made if “we know the value of what is
obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.”268 The
fundamental problem in the valuation of a legal dispute is that there is no
market for competitive pricing and uncertainty is the governing condition of a
lawsuit.269 Coase posited that substantial transaction cost may be expended for
the “rearrangement of legal rights,” and the standard economic model assumes
this cost to be the cost to accessing the pricing mechanism.270 Litigation
reduces variance through increased weight and insight into the nature of unique
and general risks, allowing parties to assess value based on information. The
expenditure of transaction cost is the primary cost in this process. But
266 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937). This cost explains the
existence of firms, which reduces the “cost of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each
exchange transaction which takes place on a market.” Id.
267 Coase, supra note 27, at 6.
268 Id. at 2.
269 See Cooter, supra note 20, at 17 (“However, there is another obstacle [to bargaining] of an entirely
different kind, namely the absence of competitive price.”).
270 Coase, supra note 27, at 15.
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regardless of how much is spent, disputants can never simulate conditions of
market pricing and significant valuational uncertainties always exist. The key
insight of this Article is that transaction cost of litigation, primarily a cash
item, is not synonymous with the true economic cost of resolution. The true
economic cost must incorporate the entire portfolio of dispute risk.
Probability and variance are the key determinants of value. Under this
scheme, each party has a selection horizon H that is unique to her risk
preference. The case assessment S is a point in a matrix where S = [Pi, σi]. As
noted before, these points move as a random walk through the litigation
process. Probability and variance are subjectively perceived and rational
parties may have widely divergent views. This is consistent with Black’s
concept that price fluctuates within a broad range in a liquid, efficient market.
Accordingly, consider the positions of three disputants A, B, and C in Figure 5.

Figure 5
Selection and Risk Adjustment

Variance

a
Settlement

Trial

b

Probability

Unique risk preferences and costs of variance yield different locations and
slope values of the selection horizons Ha, Hb, and Hc. Based on the position of
one’s case assessments relative to one’s selection horizon, individual
preferences are seen: Sa is in a quadrant where A tends toward settlement; Sb
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tends toward trial; and Sc is indifferent since it lies on the selection horizon Hc.
We can denote beta β as the shortest distance from the case assessment S to
one’s selection horizon S' such that β = |S' − S|. In the above, betas are
measured as a for A and b for B. Beta is the risk adjustment, which is a
function of probability, variance and risk preference. Since A prefers to settle,
β(a) is the maximum discount A is willing to concede to settle. Conversely,
since B prefers trial, β(b) is the premium B must be offered to settle rather than
go to trial.
Under this scheme, it is apparent that the standard economic model is not a
general economic model of bargaining, but rather a special case where the case
assessments for both parties lie on their respective selection horizons. No risk
adjustment would be made and so valuation is simply V = P x J ± T.
Settlement would hinge on whether there is a contract zone of overlapping
valuations. Thus, under this special condition, probability and transaction cost
are the most predominant factors in the selection process in this special case.
In most cases, however, the assessments lie outside of the selection
horizon, and thus risk adjustment plays a prominent role in the pricing of a
disputed claim. Consider the case of plaintiff A versus defendant C in Figure
5. Their probability assessments are identical and so delta is zero. The
application of the standard model would result in certain settlement since both
probability assessments are the same. But this conclusion fails to consider the
difference in their perceptions of variance and the selection horizons. A tends
to settle while C is neutral on the selection. The prospect of settlement
depends on the offsets of the risk adjustments, transaction cost savings, and
differences in the risk-neutral valuations, at the end of which valuations must
intersect. The starting point is simply expected value, where (P x J) denotes
the amount a party expects if liability is found, discounted by the intensity of
one’s feelings. It is human nature that the stronger one feels about the
rightness of a position, the less she is prone to compromise. The resulting
values, denoted as Va and Vc, are then subject to a risk adjustment. Here, A
prefers to settle given his position and thus is open to a risk adjustment to price
in the form of a discount to settlement valuation. The amount of this risk
adjustment varies with each party. This variance does not depend on a
reference to some fixed decision standard, but instead is a function of the
location of one’s assessment S relative to one’s selection horizon H. In this
case, β(a) is the risk adjustment. On the other hand, C is neutral and so no risk
adjustment is made. Lastly, we cannot ignore the value of the litigation option
as discussed before. The value of the option, denoted π, depends on the degree
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of uncertainty: If one party perceives variance to be higher, the procedural
option value should be higher than the other party’s. Under this set of pricing
conditions, settlement occurs where Va − β(a) − Ta + πa ≤ Vc + Tc − πc.
Otherwise, the settlement price mechanism fails to resolve the dispute, and the
selection of the unilateral trial option is inevitable.
Consider now the case of A versus B. Their perceptions of the case are
markedly different. B feels strongly about his case and also believes the
variance of this case assessment to be low. The location of his assessment
relative to the selection horizon suggests a strong preference for trial, but as
before, A prefers settlement. Under this condition, both A and B discount their
respective settlement valuations. Under this set of pricing conditions,
settlement occurs when Va − β(a) − Ta + πa ≤ Vb − β(b) + Tb − πb. Mutual risk
adjustments tend to offset, meaning the plaintiff’s concession on valuation is
negated by the defendant’s valuational demand. As a result of this dynamic,
this case resembles the risk-neutral valuation of the standard model and is
highly susceptible to various factors that may push the case one way or the
other.
This pricing model explains why, outside of small, routine cases,
transaction cost may not be the central inquiry in meritorious actions. On the
one hand, it is a curious phenomenon that, despite seemingly endless
complaints about the high cost of litigation, parties continue to litigate as a way
to resolve disputes. Surely, one would think that the legal market would make
adjustments over the course of many years and make the process more
efficient. On the other hand, we see that such ex post rationalization fails to
consider the fact that valuation is always an ex ante forward-looking exercise.
Uncertainty is the governing condition of a meritorious legal action.
Transaction cost is a source of surplus, but it is also the price of better
assessments of probability and variance. This assessment then determines the
risk adjustment, which is imbedded in the valuation and, as Summers and
Cutler observe, can exceed the value of the transaction cost surplus by many
fold.271 Without an adequate determination of probability and variance, case
assessment is incomplete and settlement can be a speculative gamble.
Valuational gains can offset cash outlays. The critical inquiry is the proper
balance.

271

See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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Under this pricing theory, the valuation of an ambiguous legal claim
involves assessments of probability, weight, unique risk, general risk, and cost
of risk preference. These concepts are linked by well-established principles of
financial economics. Ultimately, a party must ask two fundamental questions.
What is the risk? How does it affect price? In theory, principles of financial
economics answer both questions. In practice, the analogy to financial
economics is limited. The public markets can quantify, for example, the cost
of equity, option value, and firm value.272 Much of the work is rote, except
that as Black alluded, the art of practical finance involves the effort to
distinguish information from noise.273 Here, too, at the bottom of the
analytical well is subjective belief. Beneath the enormous sophistication of the
financial markets is the collective push and pull of ideas on valuation where
the mathematical expectation of a market participant is zero. The art of legal
valuation is more subjective than economic asset valuation. While law and
economic literature attempts to instill analytic rigor to the process, there are
limitations. Only the cost of risk preference is a hard number. Concepts of
probability, weight, unique risk, and general risk are highly subjective,
susceptible to multiple plausible interpretations. Nevertheless, a substantial
majority of cases settle. Given the complexities of the interactions, it may
seem like a miracle that any case settles. But we expect rational parties to
hone in on the broad range of pricing needed for transactional efficiency.
Despite the noise inherent in subjectivity and inquiries into the unknown, most
parties can price an ambiguous claim in a way that ultimately reaches
settlement. Indeed, the dynamic uncertainty of a stochastic process suggests
that at various points in the litigation process, the valuations of parties will
intersect, and perhaps on more than one occasion. That so many cases settle
suggests the legal market works efficiently despite the noncompetitive nature
of prices. That said, the inability to settle need not be the indication of error,
but simply the limitations of an illiquid pricing mechanism.

272 See Black & Scholes, supra note 198, at 638 (proposing a theory of option valuation); Markowitz,
supra note 172, at 91 (proposing Portfolio Theory); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of
Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 436–42 (1964) (proposing the Capital Asset
Pricing Model). Unlike some other branches of economics, financial economics enjoys a tangible “symbiosis”
between theory and application in market practices. Sam Peltzman, The Handbook of Industrial Organization:
A Review Article, 99 J. POL. ECON. 201, 211 (1991).
273 See supra Part IV.B.
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CONCLUSION
Bargaining theory is endlessly fascinating because it is infinitely complex.
Each insight adds a detail to the mosaic, but complete clarity is elusive. The
standard economic model paints the subtleties of human intelligence at work
with sweeping impressionistic strokes. The picture portrays human behavior in
a static, linear manner when the general observation is that it is subject to
complex, stochastic processes where uncertainty is the norm and the future is
unpredictable. The broad brushstrokes fail to capture the nuances. The
purpose of this Article is to step back and consider whether the portrait
sufficiently resembles our observation of the world. I have concluded that it is
a flawed vision of the general system of bargaining.
Fundamentally, a legal dispute involves the valuation of an ambiguous
claim. Both settlement and litigation seek to resolve that uncertainty. Upon
settlement or final judgment, there is absolute certainty. Before this point in
time, however, there is only varying degrees of risk and perceptions of risk and
reward. Settlement and litigation are best seen as pricing mechanisms of an
ambiguous legal claim. By focusing on probability and transaction cost, the
standard economic model fails to incorporate all risks into its valuation model,
and thus the true economic cost of resolution is not reflected in the valuation.
It overstates the measurability of probability, which is really gauged only by
the intensity of a person’s rational belief in a proposition and the importance of
transaction cost economics. Although economic theory in legal bargaining can
be seen as an attempt to mimic a costless Coasian world, we should not forget
that Coase assumed “conditions of perfect competition” and that transaction
cost is the cost of accessing the pricing mechanism. Even an infinite
expenditure of transaction cost cannot achieve conditions of market
competition because each transaction is noncompetitive. Nor is it feasible to
accurately predict price. What remains are varying degrees of perceived
uncertainty, and the parties must adjust their price in accordance with these
perceptions. Thus, the cost of using the pricing mechanism must be more than
transaction cost and must include the entire cost of dispute resolution. This
cost includes transaction cost and a risk adjustment to the anticipated cash
flow.
Settlement and litigation involve different packages of risk. A selection
theory cannot ignore this duality. It is stipulated that a trial is a risky endeavor.
But a settlement can be no less risky. A blind settlement is foolhardy; a
settlement under uncertainty, disquieting; a settlement with complete
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information, preferable. The selection of settlement or trial involves a complex
valuational calculus that is not captured by the current understanding. The
concept of value is relative. Under the standard economic model, value is
relative to the concept of a fixed decision standard. I reject that approach.
Under this Article’s pricing theory, value is relative to each party’s selection
horizon, which is only in part influenced by the perception of the decision
standard. Settlement occurs only if the pricing conditions allow a “trade” in
which each side can profit from the pricing mechanism. If not, the pricing
mechanism for trial provides the superior return. Thus a normative division
between settlement and litigation does not exist. Rather, most trials result from
rational choices in the face of dynamic uncertainty. If so, trials have been
falsely maligned as economically wasteful activity, a thought that is
unfortunately axiomatic in the current intellectual environment.
The
implication of restoring the reputation of a trial as a useful function is vast,
touching on virtually every aspect of the administration of justice.

